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EDITORIAL

Terrorism Jihadist etiology, present in our lives since just a few years ago, has evolved as our forces and security forces and intelligence services have been hindering its goals either anticipating their acts or stopping their work recruitment, indoctrination and funding.

Everything and so, terror has permeated our society, and even imperceptibly, increasingly radical and violent ideology appears before any event that our mind relates to your way of acting. When a person performs an action where the safety of the population is at risk and their way of perpetrating is similar to that used by these terrorists, quickly reaches our thinking the terrorist attack. These days in Europe several events with a modus operandi similar to that used by lone wolves and individual terrorists Dáesh,

In Europe we were up on Tuesday with news of a chase by police in Barcelona of a truck butane gas cylinders that went against the direction of the city center. The first thing that came to mind to many was the idea of a terrorist, after it was confirmed that no. A man of Swedish nationality 32 years after stealing a truck butane began circulating direction against a wounded and causing several damages in its wake. Finally, thanks to the exemplary performance of the police stopped avoid greater evils.

This past Sunday, without going any further, another driver perpetrated a massive run over with a truck rolling at least 28 people in New Orleans, the first idea, another attack at the hands of a lone wolf. Finally it seems not. It was a man driving under the influence of alcohol, and drugs. This Sunday, another outrage in Germany has caused one dead and three wounded. Police shot the driver tried to flee armed with a knife after the accident. Authorities rushed to dismiss the terrorist attack to calm the population.

Terrorists have achieved that we present in our minds even when they have nothing to do with the events. While we need to be aware of the risk that these terrorist groups are for the West we must not fall into one of its main objectives: to make us live in a state of fear and stop doing activities for fear of what they can do to us. Be aware and know the risks we have while terrorism is among us, but we must not let this make us change for the worse our rights and freedoms worked hard to get. Safety awareness of a country starts with the citizen himself.

David Garriga
codirector

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The phenomenon of terrorism

DAESH financing

Analyst: Enric Caballeria



Before you begin to explain how the terrorist group is financed DAESH, I need to make a series of comparisons between this and the terrorist group Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda has traditionally been funded by donations from countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and European economic jihadists called that through religious humanitarian organizations send their donations. Since 11-S developed countries try to control transfers of money from these organizations. Therefore donors have found a way to avoid this control.

Hawala is a "transfer parole", and is performed through a guarantor that charges a small commission. Normally to make such transfers, intermediary companies installed in countries where banking supervision is quite lax used. frontmen played the dual role of fundraisers and transfer intermediaries, through social communication programs Whats App type are also used.

For the intelligence services and police DAESH financial control is even more complex than that of Al-Qaeda. Financial bulk of DAESH not come from donations from other countries or sympathizers, but the economic benefits are extracted from the territories they control.

Control and DAESH financial operations are managed either by civilian experts in economics who perform their jobs voluntarily or forced by the organization experts to work for them. Today we know more about the financing of DAESH thanks to a military operation in May 2015 by a group of Special Operations United States Army, who shot dead Sayyaf Fathi Ben Awn al Tunisi, responsible maximum of finance DAESH. Also important was the capture of women at Tunisi, Umm Sayyaf, who with her a few hard drives met all important information.

According to a US government report made public in December 2015, raising the DAESH fixed at 73 million dollars a month. According to recent estimates the terrorist group would have obtained so far between 900 and 1,370 million. Now I will detail the organization's income coming from multiple sources.

Revenues from oil sales

Since the summer of 2014, 43% of revenues come from DAESH oil exploitation in the territories it controls. As much oil they extract comes from Syria. In the summer of 2014, the jihadists managed to seize the eastern province of Deir ez Zor, where the largest oil reserves in the country are located. In July of that same year, already controlled Omar oil field, the best in Syria.

According to Undersecretary of the Treasury of the United States, Adam J. Szubin, he said that some of this oil crosses the border to Turkey and the rest is spent within the territory of the US.

The method of transporting this crude was done through tankers to Turkey, where he bought at half price. The international coalition since 2015 has systematically bombarded these caravans of trucks, in addition to destroying a dozen oil fields in Syria.

Income from other natural resources

Besides extracting oil and sell the DAESH diversified its revenues and exploiting cement, sulfur, phosphates, cotton, water and salt and others. In December 2015, Vitali Churkin, Russian representative in the Security Council of the UN, said the DAESH had received about 700 million dollars from the sale of resources other than oil.

Income from bank seizure

Each city that manages to control DAESH first thing unwary are banks. At the entrance of the jihadists in the Iraqi city of Mosul, they entered the Central Bank of the city where it is estimated that stole about 425 million dollars. It is important to remember that Islam forbids usury, and for jihadists banks commit this sin.

Income from taxes

According to data from the hard drives of Ben Awn al Tunisi, the DAESH cobra around 20% in tax rates for each of the services provided. These services include electricity, telephone and internet access is

located, among others. These taxes have to be added extortion and confiscation of property. Important to say that some populations has been applied a tax (jizya) to the non-Muslim communities, who pay a tax in exchange for protection.

Revenues from smuggling

7% of revenue comes from DAESH drug trafficking, human organs, antiques, international donations, real estate and transport, slave trade and kidnapping, among others.

As a reflection say that all these revenues, the jihadists use them to pay his troops, both financially and in materials. The problem for DAESH is living in the territories it controls, and, as is losing territory is losing its economic and financial capacity.

In my opinion this setback generates me some questions:

- If the DAESH lose its economic capacity, it will disappear?
- Any time I lost most of the territory, it will go into hiding?
- It will be financed as has always been Al-Qaeda through donations?

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The world Triarius

Prevention and Counter-Terrorism Narrative

Lone Wolves express radicalization

Analyst: David Garriga



The concept of lone wolf, though we may seem linked to this new terrorism Jihadist etiology and try to change by anyone other than exalts the figure of the terrorist as "lone actor," and appears in references long before these terrorists shall prejudice in our society. From the anarchists of the nineteenth century, through the white supremacists who popularized the concept in the late 90s encouraging fellow racists acting alone to commit violent crimes, until now that we associate most jihadist terrorism.

This qualifier, although often contaminated by overuse in the media in cases that have nothing to do, refers to the man or woman who acts alone, without belonging to any terrorist group or under the influence of any leader. He planned the whole operation and undergoes a process of self-radicalization of jihadist ideology sources.

The various recurrent its solitary by Mohamed al Adnani (Dáesh spokesman) in September 2014 and in May 2016 served as a detonator wolves calls for some of his followers here in the West. In its statement urging the faithful to attack where they met, without central organization to communicate the role and the sole condition that they swear allegiance to the terrorist group publicly before perpetrating the attack.

It seems that one of the calls Al Adnani before the month of Ramadan last year caused an encouraging effect on some young people who shared ideology with these terrorists though they were not exactly practicante- Muslims. Ease of access to information

on social networks radical nature has served as a facilitator mechanism to express such violence contained in exchange for knowing that his martyrdom will be published on social networks.

Today, becoming a soldier of the Caliphate here in the West is extremely simple and fast. It does not take a firm cause or ideology on the strict practice radical Islam, to make public your only link is enough to end up dying as a martyr. If we add a distinctive personality traits, many actors present in the recent attacks in the West, we have an explosive combination.

In less than two months since the last call DAESH spokesman kill his supporters in the West, three young men agreed to die fighting for the cause of these terrorists. Omar Mateen, 29, author of the attack on a nightclub in Orlando, killed 49 people after calling the emergency number (911) and swear their allegiance to DAESH. Mateen, graduated in criminology justice and licensed to carry weapons, went through different jobs, housing changes, several divorces and possible homosexuality. Larossi Abballa, 25, committed the murder of a policeman and his partner with taking a hostage (his son three years). After committing petty crimes, he was captured by DAESH via the Internet in 2011. He recorded his loyalty and belonging to the terrorist group in a video before perpetrating the killings. By last, Muhamad Riyad, 17, author of the attack with an ax on a regional train in southern Germany which caused several stab injuries, recorded his intention to attack the train in a video that the terrorists spreading hours later. But perhaps we will remember for a long time was perpetrated by Mohamed Lahouaiej, French of Tunisian origin aged 31 and divorced with three children and with previous criminal records and a truck ran over and killed 86 people on the Promenade des Anglais, Nice, July 14, national day of France.

As for those who are repeated in most of these youthful features, we find a distinct lack of control over impulsivity, many of them have convictions and complaints of ordinary crimes, violence, drug use, gambling ... with no capacity be handled in adverse situations in life: divorce, job loss ... this makes them lack of control generates a frustration that easily becomes violence against him or those who feel guilty of their situation. If these features we add a radical, accessible and easy to carry to term through

social networks speech, we have a very dangerous cocktail.

Let us not forget that we are facing a global terrorism that lives among us and, far from stopping, will continue to handle, radicalized and attempting to achieve their goals. Closing our eyes to this evidence and not act decisively against this terrorism only serves to give oxygen to these murderers in order to perpetrate further massacres. We are not few analysts we agree that such attacks low operational complexity but have a strong human impact on the

number of victims that drag, are difficult to detect and thus to neutralize time.

However, against this current wave of espresso lone wolves, we should ask ourselves if this is a change in strategy by these groups jihadist etiology to attack the West more strongly after its obvious territorial losses in Syria and Iraq, or if you just it is a pure smokescreen to distract the bodies and security forces against an attack even greater impact in the short term.

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Cyber-Terrorism

Competition by Cyber Caliphate

Analyst: Marc Fornós



Image captured on the network by Marc Fornós

At the beginning of the birth of Triarius, we started with an article concerning the Cybercalifato or as they call them, the UCC (United Cyber Caliphate), but who are they? The UCC is the unit of cyber attack DAESH, responsible for multiple tasks, which is divided into subunits, such as the UCC, GHOST, SOC, ODO, KALACHNIKOV TEAM. This set of equipment form the Cibercalifato full, it must be said that the UCC not only compose expert hackers able to gather information of military personnel from the US, hack cameras, or pages and web servers, but there can see tweeters, youtubers, designers, editors, etc. A date of February the UCC is engaged in a campaign asking staff to their ranks, support the cause, and the ability to design and social networking,

The Cyber Caliphate or UCC he has left an enemy, perhaps do not know if as powerful as himself, but for the moment they have entered the cyborg panorama stealthily, but declaring open the ISIS war, and therefore a a bitter taste to the tenacity of cyborg Mujahidin, who had so far.

Your competition is called IKCC, Imam Khomeini Cyber Camp and unity of cybernetic attacks are the self-proclaimed IRI soldiers with its CCO (Center of Cyber Operations), apparently are from Iran, and thus defined in their attacks, stating cyberwar to ISIS. By the time you made some cyber incursions attacking ISIS, referring to accounts in social networks, which personally was able to observe, but do not confuse the competence of the cyberguerra in an ally, but in most other player in the cyborg land, because as we said, it is the responsibility of cybercalifato, not a Western ally against ISIS. The IKCC refers in its propaganda, the leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution, Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, better known in western lands as Ayatollah Khomeini,

Reflection:

The picture of the war in the network expands, and cybernetics war concerns us all, increasingly, the necessary responsibility of the defense in this field, and for the safety of everyone is, in my opinion, as unstoppable position to establish a common coalition to defend ourselves in this new war. The government of Western countries have an inescapable responsibility in the field of cybersecurity, and there is a need to establish a policy of cybernetic international framework, it is an obligation to defend the rights of its citizens and freedom of movement without fear not only physically within a country, but now in cyberspace, but also the right training in the cyber domain, its citizens and the whole structure that makes up a country.

Jihad generation

The woman, the heart of Jihad

Analyst: Antonio Martin



In the year 2017 we continue reading, listening and watching the atrocities being committed by terrorist groups around the world, abducting and indoctrinating innocent girls for their needs. These small be exploited in various ways until their exhaustion, crying out to heaven for someone to end once and for all their suffering.

In South America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) and Bacrim (acronym for "criminal gangs") have since 1975 recruited a whopping number of 11,566 children in its ranks.

Girls are mainly recruited to develop two specific functions, data collection and more risky and high mortality, to infiltrate hostile areas. They used in these more specific when considering that they spend more unnoticed among people, thus being able to develop the role entrusted with greater success functions.

In Africa as indicated by Unicef, in 2015 the figure rose to 44 cases of children who were taken to commit suicide bombings in crowded markets of people (counting only cases detected in Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon, to 133 as far as 2016 terms).

The vast majority of these attacks, 75 percent, were performed by girls or young women. Not forget that Daesh subsidiary in Nigeria, Boko Haram, is today carrying out abductions of girls indiscriminately which will later be used at will.

In the Middle East the Daesh terrorist group since 2014 is arbitrarily detaining, mistreating, torturing and forcibly marrying women and girls in Sunni areas under their control in Iraq, according to Human Rights Watch.

In 2015 the "artigoo website" published a list where the price of women tasaba not only for its beauty but also for her age and verified by the United Nations.

Among all the many atrocities that Daesh committed with indoctrinating children in Syria and Iraq, girls and adolescents are the heart of jihad, playing a key role in his caliphate.

These minors are used as sex slaves to relieve the tension of the mujahedeen warriors, sold as slaves, forcibly married and of course, are the lifeline to bring the world's future warriors who keep alive the armed struggle and radical jihadist ideology.

Europe is increasingly proliferating narrative aimed at children and adolescents for recruitment and indoctrination, some even willing to travel to Syria to join a fake profile of social networks that convinced him that there would live a full life without being a plus.

A well-structured way lies being so effective that the cases of these children and adolescents continues to grow captured.

The start of your nightmares begins when they arrive and see the harsh light of reality not being other than being deceived to become the XXI century a slave, serving warriors, marrying against their will and engendering future "cubs caliphate".

Those who realized too late that found reality and tried to end their slavery trying to escape were executed for treason in front of others to instill the fear of trying to escape.

According to a report quoting the British services "sputnik world", there is a latent threat of attacks that perpetrate women and children. Sputnik world also reflected a part of the report which says: "It is likely that the threat posed by women is so huge that it is impossible to evaluate with intelligence means available".

The stark reality is already shaping in the arrests carried out by the Forces of European Security, in which minors are already being detained for terrorist cell integration.

In Montpellier, France, it stopped to less than 16 years a member of a terrorist cell that sought to travel to Syria before his partner committed a suicide bombing in France. Also in Paris, France, in the cathedral of Notre Dame a few months ago only three women aged 19, 23 and 39 "radicalized and fanatical" were detained planning a car bombing left without license plates and with emergency lights lit .

In the car an empty gas cylinder in the passenger seat and five other full in the trunk was found.

It has to change the mentality in Europe, which is mistakenly thinks and analyzes that girls and women are making the decision to join Daesh by infatuation through social networks. A major change of structure, construction and execution of attacks by teenage girls is developing in the world in front of everyone and you have to stop it.

Today's counter-narrative is the most powerful deterrent available to governments. Applying

prevention programs against violent radicalization can counter the narrative that manages to convince these children and adolescents to make these radical changes in your life.

Provide training on what to look to the police, it is the best tool we may have to face the daily struggle in detecting potential recruiters who haunt these minor and subsequently become not conscripted but in recruiting.

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European stance against Terrorism

European Muslims Do they support terrorism?

Analyst: Javier Torregrosa



One of the great debates that have emerged in recent years in Europe (and reaches its peak after a few days of an attack was committed) is usually the whether Muslims should condemn actively radical ideology derived in these terrorist activities . In fact, it has come to suggest that Muslim communities could be even covering or supporting such activities, and hence required (from varied spheres) has an open condemnation whenever he commits one of these acts.

Acts that a priori may seem purely ideological claims hide large population internal conflicts. For example, we must not forget that Donald Trump tried to launch a reform to veto the entry to members of certain countries have or not a visa. What accounts for this? Trump, as indicated above, is but the result of a public opinion, shown fearful and angry at what they believe is an attack of aliens to their status quo. In Europe, of course, the situation is not very different, with different ideological groups directly accusing practitioners of Islam to be enablers of terrorist acts that have shaken Europe for years.

What is known, however, about the real opinion of Muslims on terrorist acts committed in Europe? Do they support the Muslims living in Europe such acts? What elements can bring such support, if need be?

In order to analyze objective data on the subject, it is interesting to refer back to study "Perceptions of world politics and support for terrorism among Muslims. Evidence of predominantly Muslim countries and Western Europe" held in 2013. In it, interviews practicing Muslims both Western countries (France, Germany, Spain and the UK) and predominantly Muslim countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey), in order to understand certain features that may lead them to support

actions terrorists. Here is a brief summary of the results:

*Note:*for reasons of issue of this section and space, the data analyzed will focus on the results of European Muslims. We recommend the reader, if interested, also delve into data on countries of Muslim origin.

- There is a big difference between the two support large groups of Muslims: 58.7% in traditionally Muslim countries never support terrorist acts, compared with 71.1% in Western European countries. In the case of Europe, also 10.8% rarely justified, 10% would justify sometimes and 4.3% would justify relatively frequently.

- The people in Europe and Muslims who consider the West guilty of economic problems that Muslim countries live more frequently tend to support terrorism.

- In turn, Muslims living in Europe and they disagree on the form of government of the country in which they reside (democracy versus authoritarianism) tend to legitimize terrorism with greater regularity.

- On the other hand, when the identification of these European Muslims with the culture of country living is less, it is more likely to legitimize terrorist activities.

- With regard to the social differences between European Muslims, the older and more formal education are acquired, less terrorism rests.

- Finally, the four countries studied, those with less support for terrorism was Germany. Followed by the UK and Spain, and finally, greater support for terrorism concentrated medium is France (it is important to remember that data from this study are from 2013, and given the emergence of the terrorist attacks in Paris, Charlie Hebdo and Berlin these perceptions may have changed).

These results may be revealed two interesting conclusions about the hypothetical support of Islamic terrorism believers.

First, it is very important to improve the integration of Muslim groups in European communities. As is clear from the results, the feeling of not belonging to the culture in which they live, as well as the feeling that Europe is in some way guilty of the problems of Muslim countries, causes an increase in justification of terrorism. That is why the emphasis should be on getting these religious groups of the community feel, thus avoiding the creation of ghettos or territories exclusively dedicated to these people (which causes

a separation between them and individuals believed the dominant) culture.

And, secondly, the importance of creating a genuine counternarrative and track focused on young people, who are no longer just a risk group when being captured, but also tend to support more terrorist

activities. Early intervention in schools, with lectures and risk controls, may be important support to prevent this from occurring. Thus, the correct inclusion of the young in European society cause is not tempted to justify (or embrace) extremist ideologies that justify terrorist acts.

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Intelligence and Terrorism

Service Intelligence ¿European Union?

Analyst: José Manuel Ávalos Morer

December twenty two thousand sixteen, Milan (Italy), a Tunisian 25-year-old Amri Anis Ben is shot dead by Italian police shouting "Allahu akbar" while firing at the officers. Five days earlier, on December 19 of that year, Anis Ben Amri massive outrage perpetrated on a Christmas market in Berlin (Germany) with the fatal result of twelve people dead and fifty-six wounds. During those five days Anis Ben Amri had had time to cross in Germany train from Berlin to Chambéry (France), change trains in Chambéry direction of Turin (Italy) and try to take another train in Milan, but finally it was killed by Italian police during a routine check at three in the morning.

Undoubtedly this is an episode that, when played on several occasions over recent years public opinion reopen the debate on the usefulness of a common police for all member states of the European Union and if I apuráis up an army common. And generates another debate draft: the utility and / or creation of a "European CIA" who cry and crave from numerous forums more pro-European court.

Notably, there are already some European agencies responsible for intelligence, here are some and how useful are:

Intelligence Center and Situation of the European Union (EU Intelligence and Situation Center).



In charge of intelligence of the European Union, it is integrated in the European External Action Service, so it is under the tutelage of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy (AR). Its main task is to provide intelligence analysis, development of early warning systems and inform both the High Representative and the subsidiary bodies of this and all member states. It focuses mainly on issues related to foreign policy and international situation supported by four divisions: Analysis, Open Source (OSINT), Situation Center and Crisis Management Consular.

Intelligence Division (intDiv) of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

It is another department of the European Union under the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (AR) and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European

Union. It is responsible for monitoring operations related to the Common Security and Defense Policy. It focuses mainly on all operations by the European Union humanitarian, peace and crisis management led by early warnings, status reports and strategic planning for missions of military and civilian character.



Satellite Center (EUSC or SATCEN).

An agency of the European Union more dependent on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (AR). Its mission is to provide early warnings of potential crises to allow time to

take appropriate action. Focus on the collection of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analyzing critical



infrastructure, military capability and weapons of mass destruction by information provided by different sensors: optical, radar, infrared, etc.

European Gendarmerie Force (EGF or EUROGENDFOR).



EU body formed by the military police, so Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Romania are members as they have at their borders national bodies of this kind: Spanish Guardia Civil, French Gendarmerie Nationale, Italian Carabinieri, Royal

Marechaussée nerlandesa, Portuguese National Republican Guard and Gendarmerie Rumana. Notably it has a section on intelligence and act beyond Europe's borders: Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), Mali (EUCAP SAHEL) and Afghanistan (Resolute Support).

The European Police Office (EUROPOL).



One of the most important organs of the European Union is the European Police Office which is primarily

responsible for the operations of the fight against crime throughout the European Union, is present in almost all of the 28 Member States of the Union European and focus on terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering on an international scale, organized fraud, counterfeiting currency and smuggling. It has sections responsible for information gathering, analysis, and intelligence.

Schengen Information System (SIS).



Despite not being implemented in all member countries of the European Union Information System Schenger provides relevant information about people with extradition orders,

runaways, disappear, with order search and seizure, customs controls and police information vehicles, aircraft, ships, etc. All participating countries have an office in order to nourish the information system, information exchange and communication with other offices distributed system members.

So what makes the composition of a European intelligence service is a utopia? One of the main problems is information. Sharing information is not always successful, we encountered problems even among law enforcement agencies within a single member state of the European Union. In Spain, for

example, there are cases in which different police forces and their units are reluctant to share information, the success of its operations is vital to their budget allocations, and that's just one of the handicap to cooperate among law enforcement agencies we find others such as duplication of information with consequent damages.

On the other hand, the intelligence of a nation is reserved and serves the interests and needs of the country, this would hardly be able to exchange information with other member states of the European Union. unadulterated information, unreliable, biased intentionally, mistranslations and irrelevance for own interests: Also, if the case of exchange of information is given numerous chiaroscuro open. Additionally, you can highlight the sources, how to obtain information, procedures, interests and needs, means of intake information, etc.

We must emphasize that the creation of a European intelligence service would obey a legal structure supranational and should be legislated and regularized by judicial and parliamentary control, something in the very complex present within the heart of the European Union. In addition, as already highlighted, each EU member state has interests, needs and own threats and in most cases far from other member states.

In conclusion, and as has been evident, especially without the existence of interests, needs and common threats is virtually impossible to create a European intelligence service.

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Technical means Terrorist

Kalashnikov in Europe

Analyst: José Luis Franco



When Mikhail Kalashnikov designed the assault rifle AK-47 could not imagine, this humble sergeant Russian Army trucks, so infamous that would be so precious and new machinery of war in those years.

A simple design that makes it easy to manage and maintain, must be added robustness, 7.62x39mm caliber, the 600 shots per minute and 400 meters effective range. Well, if all this is added the variable price in some countries in Africa and the Middle East is between 50 and 150 dollars any of its illegal variants, it makes it ideal for a terrorist group and its insurgent war, where not available a maintenance step.

Kalashnikov Corporation holds the patent system and therefore is illegal to manufacture unauthorized, but it is believed that about 11 countries is manufactured without authorization given the simplicity of parts and recoil system easy to imitate gases.

We can say that the traffic of this type of assault rifles to our Europe can come from Syria by road, but we think that these guns have lived for years in our countries from arms trafficking to nourish organized especially crime matters related drug trafficking. It is believed that Brussels is one of the main points of Europe for illegal arms brokers. ETA entered the market for the acquisition of Pomegranates MECAR, FN pistols, submachine MAT 49, etc ...

In Southeast Europe we can find the epicenter of Illegal Trafficking in Firearms, since converge in the same geographical area Organized Crime and Terrorism as well as a post war scenario that leave weapons in the hands of individuals or organizations who wanted to profit from them without and that regardless of who acquires and weak or corrupt political systems.

Certainly does not facilitate the control of these weapons and their delivery, ease of movement

around Europe thanks to the Schengen Treaty, free movement of people and goods.

When illegal weapons are sent, is usually done by parts in different packages and multiple phases, to avoid suspicion and never give the profile a rifle in Scanners or controls, it is what is called "Trade Ants" (Ant Trade).

In 2015 the number of attacks this weapon was the highest in the history of terrorism (Paris, Tunisia, Kenya, Copenhagen). Coubaly those of the brothers. It may be recalled, to observe linking the Balkans and conflicts, the arrest on November 5, Vlatko Vucelic on a German motorway. In the trunk he was carrying: a gun, two pistols, two grenades, 200 grams of TNT, eight Kalashnikovs.

In the browser of your GPS Could not find that for all is the route Kalashnikov: Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria to a border in southern Germany, the final drive, parking on the outskirts of Paris.

Was surplus of those conflicts? It is used to draw revenues in the ailing economy of a family of Montenegro? Who was addressed that burden? These are questions that must be answered and set appropriate filters.



The book AK-47: The history of gun people, Michael Hodges, gives a chilling fact. The number of Kalashnikovs in the world could reach 200 million. A kalashnikov every 35 people.

There are modern versions of old but robust AK-47, AKM, AK-12 as the famous AK-74 caliber 5,45x39mm displaying Bin Ladem, which counted as he had taken from a Russian general in the war in Afghanistan against the USSR after death, and other versions adapted to NATO caliber as the AK-12 5.56x45mm, but certainly none beats the simplicity and reliability of the AK-47.

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F-AIR COLOMBIA

Feria Aeronáutica Internacional
Rionegro - Antioquia

Del 13 al 16 de julio de 2017

Geopolitics and Terrorism

Turkey, Wall Actor Democracy and Regional Instability

Analyst: Marta García Outón



Turkey is a NATO member and key ally of the West in the Arab-Muslim region; It is a country that is strategically located at the gateway to the Middle East and in the middle of the main economic and maritime routes of Europe. However, since the attempted coup of July 15, 2015 (where defendants have connection with the Kemalist and secular country movements) and the growing regional terrorist threat led by the Syrian conflict, President Erdogan has found motivation to radically change its domestic and foreign policy. However, the geopolitical turn of Turkey, which is dangerously close to regional food violent radicalism, not only due to this event, but a sum of catalysts which are conditioned by the geographical position of the country,

Kurdish Threat

The fear of a growing Kurdish power in and around the Turkish borders has led to President Erdogan to boost its violent campaign against this ethnic group in northern Syria (especially in front of Operation Shield Euphrates and the recovery of the city Raqqa, to prevent Kurdish positioning and Daesh across the Turkish border) and in the national territory, blocking their political and social representation and carrying out harsh police repression under the guise of stopping terrorism (especially in the southwestern area country around the "capital" Kurdish in Turkey: Diyarbakir).

Historically, the largest national concern Turkey has been the Kurdish population (representing between 15% and 20% of the total population), as some of its more radical factions (such as the PKK and TAK) have arrived to form an armed resistance, especially in the south and in the capital, seeking to maintain their survival and receive his long-awaited regional and international recognition. The connection of the Kurdish population of Turkey with the sociopolitical

presence of this ethnic group in northern Syria (in the self-proclaimed Kurdish region of Rojava) and northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) - both zones scenarios protagonists of resistance and struggle against the presence and progress of Daesh,

Democratic Threat

Another effort of the current Turkish President Erdogan is to limit democracy, because it is one of the biggest incentives to give a voice to those considered enemies of the state: the Kurds, the laity and the Kemalists. Therefore, the President of the Republic of Turkey, with the excuse of the attempted coup of July 15, began (and continues to) a state purge. Most affected by this initiative has been democracy and the winners: violent extremism and Islamization of the country.

More than 125,000 Turkish nationals have been expelled or suspended from employment accused of having links with the movement of Fethullah Gullen since they began purges: 4,464 civil servants, 2,585 teachers and 350 scholars, as well as 6,000 military, exposing the journalist and PhD candidate Beatriz Yubero (which he was also expelled from the country, hunting victim of "witches"). The problem looms before the activity that has occurred after July 15: executions in the street imitating the bloody style Daesh, violence and violation of human rights and the proximity of the validation of the death penalty for the final and radical closure the opposition camp Erdogan's government.

In schools an educational system Sunni dogma imposed on the streets and persecutions against expressions accrue less close to Islam. In addition, the date of April 16, for which announced the holding of a referendum for constitutional reform under conditions of lack of freedom and delivered by one man approaches.

conclusions

"Turkey is a very serious identity crisis," said Kerim Balci Kurdish journalist in the program Geopolitical Vision debate led by Colonel Pedro Baños. Erdogan has initiated a process of redirection, from the approach to democracy and joining the European Union towards the struggle to be political-religious head in the Middle East, which implies the adoption of a more authoritarian political model. The obsession with the Kurdish threat, to defend its geopolitical and economic potential and to defend its

regional hegemonic position has led to President Erdogan to carry out covert relations with terrorist organizations and vary diplomatic ties with

neighboring countries. This situation of foreign and domestic policy authoritarian and aggressive,

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Bogotá, 4 with December 6, 2017

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
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Terrorism and Cyber Terrorism in the Southern Cone

Do you end a stage terrorist actions in the Southern Cone?

Analyst: Roberto Uzal



Natalio Alberto Nisman, Argentine prosecutor died.

As cited in previous articles, the AMIA bombing was a terrorist car bomb attack suffered by the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994. He tried one of the largest terrorist attacks in Argentina, with a balance of 85 dead and 300 injured.

Special in charge of the AMIA bombing Fiscal Unit issued an opinion in which he accused the Iranian government of masterminding the attack and Hezbollah terrorist organization to be its executive arm. The opinion was signed by prosecutors Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martínez Burgos, who asked Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral ordered the international arrest of eight Iranians, including the president of that country at the time of the attack.

As reported by the prosecutor Nisman at a press conference, the capture of Ali Akbar Hashemi, former president of Iran was requested; Fallahijan Ali, former Minister of Information and Security; Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister; Mohsen Rezaee, former commander of the IRGC; Ahmad Vahidi, former commander of the elite force Al Quds-Jerusalem Corps IRGC; Mohsen Rabbani who had three passports in different names contained and Argentine identity document; his duties were those of cultural counselor of the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires; Ahmad Reza Asghari, a former secretary of the Iranian embassy in Argentina Imad Fayed Moughnieh and former head of Hezbollah's external security.

On 25 September 2007 the President of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, strongly denounced Iran for its lack of cooperation to clarify the attack on the AMIA, at the 62nd United Nations General Assembly.

This position of extreme severity of Argentina to Iran and Hezbollah was the standard by which the

authorities of Argentina handled this issue until there was a very curious fact that we call the "Treaty of Aleppo".

In an article published by the newspaper Perfil de Buenos Aires on March 26, 2011, journalist José "Pepe" Eliashev reported that the Government of Argentina was negotiating a "secret deal" with Iran to forget the attacks in exchange for developing a "trade agenda". The government of then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner would be willing to actually suspend the investigation of the two terrorist attacks in 1992 and 1994, which were destroyed the headquarters of the Israeli embassy and the AMIA in Buenos Aires. This was revealed by a secret document until now, recently delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

This document, practically a treaty was drafted by a multidisciplinary team after the meeting that Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman (paradójicamente a member of the Jewish community in Argentina), had with his counterpart of Syria, Walid al-Mohalem, and with President Bashar al-Assad himself on 23 and 24 January 2011 in the Syrian city of Aleppo.

The government's treatment of Argentina to Iran and Hezbollah changed radically after the then held "strictly secret and confidential" Treaty of Aleppo. Moreover, the government of Argentina, through a "select" group of collaborators, provided strong support to the actions of then Brazilian President Ignacio "Lula" Da Silva aimed at establishing and consolidating geopolitical influence in South America's then President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It is a challenge to elucidate the motivations of the President "Lula" to carry out such a venture.

Upon learning of the "Treaty of Aleppo" (which actually gave impunity to those accused of the bombing of the AMIA) Prosecutor Nisman decided to denounce whitewash the then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, the Chancellor Hector Timerman and other suspects.

On January 18, 2015, Alberto Nisman was found dead with a gunshot to the head in his apartment in Torres Le Parc complex in Puerto Madero neighborhood (Buenos Aires). This occurred hours before appearing before the Criminal Law Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of Argentina, sharing

that he had cited to explain the fundamentals of their complaint to President Kirchner. He should attend on Monday 19 January, 2015.

Both cause the agreement with Iran designed to exculpate the accused of the bombing of the AMIA as the cause of the mysterious death of prosecutor Alberto Nisman, with the participation of judges and prosecutors who strictly follow government mandates, they went to a virtual "dead end" for two years. Fortunately this has been reversed in recent months. Honest judges and prosecutors are in charge of both issues: The cover to the accused and the strange death of Fiscal Nisman.

In recent days with complaints from US Senators Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida and Bob Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, they led the government of Donald Trump accused the vice president "Bolivarian" (Venezuela) Tarek Al Aissami connected narco to Mexican cartel Los Zetas, formed by military and police recipients of ephedrine that was exported from Argentina ex. There are numerous coincident and relevant evidence regarding the key role of Tarek Al Aissami in the "Iranian - Bolivarian" scheme. The dimensioning of power and capabilities Tarek Al Aissami surely facilitate the development of the cause originated in the "Treaty of Aleppo" and corresponding to the very suspicious death of the prosecutor Nisman. Partners with Al Aissami counts in Argentina are in a way, The vision of a "Bolivarian South America," geopolitically coordinated by Iran, has suffered

several downside: change of government in Brazil and Argentina, political and economic crisis in Venezuela and changing the approach "Iran good" that had adopted the previous US government .

Does this mean that it has completed the nightmare of the "Bolivarian South America" geopolitically responding to the axis Iran - Hezbollah? No way!

Iran has proven to have reached a level of excellence in "asymmetric warfare". Asymmetrical warfare is a violent conflict in which is found a significant difference between qualitative and quantitative military, political and economic resources of the contenders. Atypical sides should use such approaches as various variants of terrorism as well as aggression or the "Fifth Estate" (Cyberspace). Different types of investments already made to achieve a South American subcontinent regulated by Iran axis - Hezbollah will lead them to continue fighting firmly. Another aspect that should be discarded is "dreaming" that the case Tarek Al Aissami is an isolated incident. As an example we can mention the evidence by the Prosecutor Nisman included in the indictment of former President Kirchner.

Recommendation: In the Southern Cone we increase our capabilities to combat terrorism and work hard to mitigate our Ciber Vulnerabilities knowing that the attacks come from those who occupy a position of global leadership in the context of attacks Ciber.

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Colombia: Terrorism, War and Peace

What it is and what is not terrorism

Analyst: Douglas Hernandez



Mrs. Elvia Cortes Pachon, the first victim of the "necklace bomb" in Colombia.

It has been difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of "terrorism". Literally the word means "instill terror", which surely considered and -if nothing else would call us terrorists who produce films of that genre, so that this simplistic version can not be successful. There must be something else.

Another aspect that characterizes terrorism is that there is an act of a violent nature, is directed against people, and they are chosen randomly, is aimed particularly against "innocent" or they did not expect to be attacked people.

To achieve the desired effect ... -causar terror - this tremendously violent act directed against other human beings, should be widely disseminated among the group that is the target of the action.

Finally, and this is fundamental, the terrorist act is politically motivated. That is, trying to impose the will of one group over others.

Although it is impossible to be "purists" in the application of the term, because this has political and legal implications, and in each country there is usually a different approach under the above parameters, and guided by common sense, we can make some statements which would serve for discussion:

If a demented individual develops a bomb and explodes inside a bus with people inside it would not be strictly a terrorist act because it does not meet the above stated premises. The perpetrator lacks a political purpose.

If a bomb destroys an office building after hours, and because it causes no casualties, it should not be

taken as a terrorist act since the action was directed against property but not against people.

If the action originally not intended to be disseminated, but instead the perpetrators what they want is that just go unnoticed, it should not be considered a terrorist act. This could be the case of the forced disappearance of a group of people who are killed and buried without the knowledge of anyone except the murderers.

If violent action is directed against a particular person "to make her pay for her actions" that has the character of a vendetta or a crime of passion, no matter how awful it murder or torture of the victim, under the premises aforementioned the fact is not a terrorist act, but only a murder with cruelty and with many aggravating.

Act of extreme violence directed against other human beings (plural)

Executed with premeditation against targets they did not expect to be attacked

The action is carried out by a group with a political agenda, and has political purposes

The violent act is massively disseminated by some media

It intended to cause terror in a part of society, to break their will

On the other hand, if there is a war, declared or not, regular or irregular, civil or international, and the fighting forces attack each other repeatedly throughout the conflict, using conventional tactics and customs of war, none of it is itself a terrorist act. Even if one of the parties is exceeded and commits barbaric acts, cause unnecessary suffering to the enemy, destroy infrastructure or protected property, all of which are violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, so they fall into the category of war crimes. Shares begin to border terrorism, when the target of violent actions is the non-combatant civilians.

If we take as a guide the above specified premises, and examples of the preceding paragraphs, we will analyze some events in Colombia, in the context of the internal conflict that for 50 years has plagued the country and determine what would constitute a terrorist act and which it is definitely not a terrorist act (despite what they have said so long government spokespeople, and others).

Actual examples of terrorist acts

- Car bomb attack on the El Nogal Club in Bogota, on February 7, 2003.
- Bombing the building of Radio Caracol in Bogota on August 12, 2010.
- Bomb attack at the headquarters of the Administrative Department of Security, in Bogota on December 6, 1989.
- Attack the Palace of Justice of Cali on September 1, 2008.
- All bombings carried out by the Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, the Medellin Cartel.
- Chainsaw dismemberment * noncombatant civilians.
- mass executions of civilians, for example accused of "collaborating with the enemy" *.
- Mutilation of corpses and public display, in order to terrorize the civilian population and maintain psychological control over them *.

* When these actions have been executed by armed actors in the Colombian conflict.

Examples of violent actions that are not terrorist acts

- Hostage-taking.
- Kidnapping.
- The targeted killing.
- Drug trafficking.
- The attack on a base or military patrol.
- The ambush an enemy patrol.
- Fighting between armed groups.

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- Blowing up a pipeline or power tower.
- Placement of antipersonnel mines.
- Capturing enemy troops.

confusing events in Colombian history

- The pump case collar. Certainly it is absolutely terrifying that you put a collar bomb and threaten you that they will activate if you do not meet the demands of who you have at your mercy. However, the end of the criminals in this case was extortion (demanding 15 million pesos), although there is no certainty of who were the perpetrators and at the time the case came to light only because of the intervention The authorities. Unfortunately Mrs. Elvia Cortes Pachón-the victim died, along with the anti-explosives technician who tried to save her.
- The Palace of Justice siege by the M19, on 6 November 1985, was intended to repeat the success obtained in the seizure of the embassy of the Dominican Republic, on February 27, 1980, action that besides obtaining advertising Global to subversive movement after 61 days, the guerrillas left the place with a million dollars towards Cuba. The holocaust of the courthouse, no doubt triggered by the action of the M19, leaving a balance of death and destruction, where the perpetrators happen to be many.

We close this speech with a quote from Mr. Victor Currea-Lugo, taken from an interesting article in the Colombian newspaper El Espectador: "The word terrorism has at least two meanings: political and legal, as well as other words like apartheid, conflict, occupation. Politically terrorist anyone today is contrary to power and who is the power and name it. Legally, the issue is different, because you do not have a definition of terrorism that is accepted by all. I reiterate that these lines are simply a contribution to the discussion of the issue.

Fight against Jihadist terrorism in Spain

Spain counter-example of terrorism

Analyst: Pilar Rangel



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Terrorism constitutes one of the main threats to national security. To date we continue to level 4 activation Prevention and Anti-Terrorism Plan Protection, which is a high risk level. Since the attacks of March 11, 2004 we thank our Security Forces of the State not caused fatalities per terrorist attack on our territory.

Counterterrorist operations carried out in 2016 in Spain show that our country, as well as being a target of jihadist terrorism potential is the basis for logistics network activity capture, acting both in Europe and in the North African geographical scope and Mediterranean. It has shown that, as in the rest of Europe, from our country move through different networks catchment radicalized to conflict zones, especially Syria and Iraq individuals.

The danger posed by returning directly to Spain to terrorist fighters emerged from our country is not limited. In the case of foreign terrorist fighters from other EU countries, there is a risk that making use of freedom of movement within the Schengen territory end up coming to our country.

Meanwhile, in recent months there has been a significant increase in communications of these terrorist organizations, especially the DAESH containing generic threats to Spain or its interests abroad, make mention of the West or Europe as the target of their terrorist actions, or concrete to point to Al Andalus or certain Spanish cities character. Also this year have been published some announcements in Spanish; This implies an increased risk because of their influence on the radicals installed in our country. A collation of the above, one of the important elements to consider in the fight against violent radicalization is the control of jihadist propaganda and implementing actions to counter it.


In the summer of 2016, DAESH launched a campaign to recruit Spanish translators, suggesting a growing interest in attracting foreign terrorist fighters Spanish speakers. So internet continues to be a key instrument in the different activities that global Jihadism can develop in Spain, from recruitment and indoctrination of militants to incitement or direction of terrorist attacks in the country.

It must be taken into account also the risk of development of processes of radicalization, as is happening in other neighboring countries, could become acute or escalate to the concurrence of certain circumstances, such as the arrival of people from third countries linked radical environments.

In the fight against violent radicalization are important control measures of propaganda. Also control the flow of European Iraqi fighters Syrian scenario is of

great importance for its influence on the terrorist threat

Finally, it should be noted, in relation to this area, the importance of the actions carried out by the intelligence services and information in order to discover in time and avoid the consequences of the processes of radicalization detected, so that we can say Spain is one of the few European countries where effectively combat jihadist terrorism and an example for other neighboring countries.



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Newsletter Prevention and Security at the Global Terrorism

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If you want to provide testing or analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism, from any approach, and contribute to enriching the views presented in this newsletter, please write to hernandez.douglas@hotmail.com



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