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EDITORIAL

We want to start this edition by sending a fraternal greeting to the directors, teachers, and administrative staff of all higher education institutions that have taken this publication as reference material. But in particular to the students, men and women who are training to take the reins of public and private organizations, and of society as a whole. We are deeply moved to know that with our articles and analyzes we are helping to educate the new generations, preparing them to face the complexities of the world we have had to live in, particularly with regard to terrorism and new threats. We will continue working with great enthusiasm, knowing that our work is useful and necessary also in the academy.

The first article in this, our 66th edition, deals with the situation in Nigeria, and how the government of that country is dealing with the many terrorist groups operating in its territory. In the second, we received a briefing on the political, economic and geopolitical consequences of the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani.

Following this, Ulises León Kandiko presents us with the latest installment of the series of articles on Intelligence-Oriented Police Activity. We hope that this information sheds light on those responsible for citizen security who read us.

Guadi Calvo returns with two very interesting analyses, this time placing us in Mozambique and Pakistan, Africa and Central Asia. There he presents us with the corresponding situational reports, which allow us to understand a large part of the security and defense problems of those countries and of the region where they are inserted, with his customary narration as clear as it is critical.

Julian Urrego, from Colombia, provides a brief analysis of the Municipal PISCC, and how these can be articulated to security strategies in the regions of the department of Antioquia. It seems opportune to recommend the reading of Kandiko's contributions referring to Intelligence-Oriented Police Activity, as complementary information to Urrego's article.

Guadi Calvo takes us to the African Sahel region, to give an account of the situation faced by local, regional and international security forces there. The problem of terrorism has not been able to be controlled, and on the contrary it is spreading. Next, he presents us with an analysis of the possible consequences of the peace agreement signed by the Donald Trump government with the Taliban in Afghanistan, an issue that the Taliban claim to be an unquestionable victory.

We end this installment with a note on the OPV-80 naval patrol boats manufactured by the Colombian shipyard Cotecmar and which, thanks to their versatility, have made it possible to carry out multiple and varied missions in support of national interests and international security.

Know to win!

Douglas Hernández

Editor



This newsletter has a Spanish version.

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TRIARIUS

The global alarm over the outbreak of the COVID-19 strain of the "Coronavirus" family, which spreads very quickly and has a higher than usual mortality, generates a series of questions and suspicions. The role of the media is questioned, which on the one hand warn about the problem and disseminate preventive measures, but on the other hand contribute to creating anxiety in the population, create unnecessary stigmatization, such as against Asian people who reside from years ago in other countries, or on Chinese products, which obviously cannot "catch" a virus. Precisely, these last circumstances give rise to conspiracy theories that propose that this viral outbreak was provoked and seeks to commercially affect China, a powerful rival of the West and in particular of the United States. Whatever the truth, the important question here is... are you prepared to survive a pandemic?

On the cover, **Moroccan GIGR Commandos**

See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue free of charge.

Nigeria: The Wide Trail of Terror

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



All the tactics used to combat the different terrorist groups operating in Nigeria have failed, such as the fate of the famous *Boko Haram*, which according to some calculations since 2003, has killed between 30 and 50 thousand people and has caused the displacement of more than three million villagers in the north of the country, the epicenter of its actions and that, a thousand times it has been declared on the verge of disaster, resurfaces, renews itself and attacks again as lethal as ever. Or the *Ansaru group* or *Jama'at Ansaru al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan* (Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands) split from *Boko Haram* in 2012, announcing that it would "encourage what is good and take care of its propagation and would discourage evil and try to eliminate it", moreover, the only Nigerian group, which has not declared allegiance to *Daesh*, for which it is also known as *al-Qaeda* in the lands beyond the Sahel, that has specialized in

kidnapping extortion, particularly of foreign citizens and violent assaults in the states of Kebbi, Katsina and Bauchi in the center of the country. And finally the also franchisee of the *global Daesh Willat* (province) of the *Daesh* (Islamic State) of *West Africa* or for its acronym in English *ISWAP*, which last December beheaded eleven Christian prisoners in revenge for the elimination of the *Daesh* leader, *Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi* "executed" by North American commandos (See: *al-Baghdadi, the opportune dead*) The Nigerian security forces never tire of announcing successful operations against these fundamentalist movements, but they never seem to be able to put an end to that war.

The last of the great blows given -in this case by the police-, was recorded on February 5, in the forested area of Kuduru, which for years has been a true sanctuary for the takfirist organizations, which operate in the state northern Kaduna, in the operation that began on Wednesday morning and lasted

several hours, some 250 "high-profile members" of the *Ansaru group* were eliminated. To that end, the police mobilized most of their teams: the Police Mobile Force (PMF), the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), the Special Forces, the Intelligence Response Team (IRT), the Special Tactical Squad (STS) and the Special Anti-Robbery Squadron (SARS), of which none of their members were killed, although a helicopter driver suffered a minor injury, in circumstances that were not disclosed either.

According to police spokesman Frank Mba, the operation was top secret, to the point that the army commanders who are operating in the region were not even informed. Chief Mba announced that the police are preparing other similar actions throughout the country, obviously without providing more information. What has not been reported either, is with what certainty the police acted, to ensure that all the dead were militants, without causing the death of any

civilian, since the identities of the dead and their positions as "senior commanders " have not been disclosed.

Ansaru, which in 2016 received a severe blow after the arrest of its leader Khalid al-Barnawi, replaced by Usama al-Ansari, who, like his predecessor, is facing the eccentric Abubakr Shekau, leader of Boko Haram since 2009, after the death of the founder, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. The cause of the discord and the breakup of the group was produced, fundamentally, and by the mass murder of Muslims, in the recurring attacks on mosques, markets, meeting centers of that community. The *al-Ansari group* , which had not had any recognized actions since 2013, had announced its return to the fight last October, only to effectively reappear last January, when it attacked a military caravan belonging to the emir (government authority: in this case the mayor of Potiskum, a town in the state of Yobe where at least six soldiers died, on the Kaduna-Zaira highway. Other sources insist that there would be thirty army casualties. While an unknown number of troops have been declared missing or kidnapped.

In a statement from the group, *Ansaru* claimed responsibility for the attack, acknowledging that 22 had been killed, the destruction of several military vehicles, without making reference to any army personnel or kidnapped civilians, nor did it specify that the target of the attack would have been the emir Umara Bauya. It is very possible that the real reason for the ambush was to communicate "officially" that after the long interregnum, after brutally competing with *Boko Haram* , and later with *ISWAP* and the arrest of al-Barnawi, for intelligence Nigerian, the articulator of all the affiliated groups of *al-Qaeda* in West Africa", the organization endured a strong weakening, from which apparently it would be recovering and trying with this type of actions to call the attention of new recruits who want to get involved in the "holy war". According to some unconfirmed sources, al-Barnawi would have established his "court" in the north of Cameroon, where he

leads a group linked to *Ansaru* , a place where *Boko Haram* militiamen have also arrived .

Like the Harmattan, terror blows again

The actions of *Boko Haram*, for years have begun to be repeated in border countries and beyond as well. It is known that platoons of the organization have come to fight in the disputed tripartite area of Mali, Niger and Chad.

Although lately they have returned to concentrate their efforts in the north of Cameroon, where they settled in 2013, especially in the Tourou region, causing nearly 3,000 deaths and the displacement of some 530,000 people according to the OCHA (*Office for the Coordination of UN Humanitarian Affairs*).

Boko Haram is using the effects of the Harmattan, the cold, dry and dusty wind that blows in the sub-Saharan region, punctually every year, between November and March, generating, in mountainous areas such as Tourou, notorious drops in temperature, which makes it very difficult for the villagers to spend the nights away from home and search the woods to hide from terrorist attacks. That is why attacks are being repeated like those on the night of January 21 to 22, 2020, against the village of Machichia, also attacked in January 2018, by *Boko Haram* , when in the middle of the night some five hundred mujahideen arrived to the town, on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles, so the villagers had to flee, abandoning everything: houses, cattle, crops and the harvest that had just been harvested. The insurgents then set fire to everything, including the fields where they threw six elderly people who had not had a chance to escape into the flames, as well as slaughtering the cattle and stealing the harvest, which had just been harvested.

That 2018 attack stopped all activities in the region, making the situation extremely problematic, forcing the central government to arrange for the deployment in the region of the elite group of the

Cameroonian Army *Rapid Intervention Brigades* (BIR).), which forced the fundamentalists to reduce their actions, although the majority withdrew towards Nigeria, some groups that remained isolated, in the mountains of the border area, dedicating themselves to assaulting routes and some very isolated villages to survive.

Without knowing the reasons, the BIR forces began to reduce their counterinsurgency operations, reaching practically total inactivity, abandoning the villages in the area and the groups of civilian volunteers who concentrated in " *committees to their fate. surveillance* " than in posts in the mountains and only armed with bows, sticks, walkie-talkies and whistles, to warn the villages of the presence of terrorists giving villagers the chance to escape and save their lives, despite the fact that the return home was always the same "spectacle" houses and crops destroyed and cattle stolen or slaughtered.

At the beginning of 2019, *Boko Haram* returned to northern Cameroon with intensity, producing three attacks in less than a month and maintaining its operations throughout the year, but it was only a year later that the situation returned to its most critical point, with massive attacks. to the towns in the area and forcing thousands to flee, without knowing where, since the entire region is suffering from insecurity.

In the new attack on Machichia last January, all military posts were also looted, from which the terrorists have taken long-range heavy weapons, ammunition, communications equipment and vehicles. Between January 17 and 18, Hidoua had also been attacked, where the terrorists attacked three military posts and burned fourteen huts before withdrawing.

At the moment, the towns in the area, such as Hidoua, Machichia and Hitawa, are under the control of *Boko Haram* and with the possibility that if they are not rescued by the military in a week, the group's power will spread to the entire Tourou region. which could cause the arrival of important contingents of mujahideen, to become strong and


establish once again, as they did in Syria, Iraq and Libya, the long-awaited capital of the Caliphate.

Image Source:

<https://elordermundial.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Nigeria-boko-haram-portada.jpg>

Guadi Calvo

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Trump: all for power, all against Iran

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Donald Trump, President of the United States of America

Since the Hague Convention of 1907, it was established in the law of "Armed Conflicts" widely accepted by all signatory civilized nations, the "prohibition of assassinating foreign government officials outside of wartime". The decision of US President Donald Trump to assassinate the Iranian General and commander of his elite al-Quds corps, Qassem Suleimani, (See: Qassem Suleimani, who will stop death?) not only took away this regulation, but Trump immediately bragged, via Twitter, of his decision: "General Qassem Suleimani who has killed or seriously injured thousands of Americans over a long time, and was plotting to kill many more...but it was! caught! He was directly and indirectly responsible for the death of millions of people, including the large number of protesters recently in Iran" and the paragraph remains unsubstantiated, and confabulating to justify what has clearly been an unreasonable assassination.

Quickly, US officials, in an attempt to continue justifying the crime, reported that the Iranian

general was imminently preparing a series of terrorist actions against US citizens. Later, faced with the magnitude of the event and the criticism that intensified against Washington, the White House then changed its discourse, exaggerating the magnitude of the operations planned by Suleimani, until Trump abandoned the justification, a tweet that did not matter to him since the new martyr he has built for Islam, had a "horrible past". With what has been left in evidence that he killed on a whim, without any hint of legality and only for his own use. In his action, Trump has tried to generate more elements that would work in his favor to overcome impeachment, which was already upon him, and the one that he has just overcome without any consequence and for which, now, he has launched his re-election, which is disputed next November. - ximo, where he has many possibilities of obtaining a new mandate.

In addition to internal issues, with this decision Trump intended to

take another step towards a new configuration of the Middle East, which includes his peace plan for Palestine and Israel (See: Palestine, playing the whore and putting the bed), which has already been completely ruled out. The influence of the United States, to make Trump's new strategy for the region effective, is not exempt from the escalation of war between Damascus and Ankara, which, if Vladimir Putin's diplomacy fails, could become involved in a war in which only The beneficiary will be Donald Trump himself.

Last Thursday the 6th, the Middle East had a new shock, when it was officially confirmed that another North American drone destroyed a building where an undetermined number of al-Qaeda members were located in eastern Yemen. Among them was the Yemeni Qassem al-Raymi, head and one of the founders of al-Qaeda for the Islamic Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009, a man very close to Ayman al-Zawahiri, global leader of the organization, founded by Osama bin Laden, in Peshawar, Pakistan in

1988. Some sources insist that al-Raymi was the great candidate to succeed al-Zawahiri.

Qassem al-Raymi to convert his faction, the most lethal and dangerous of all al-Qaeda. In 2015, after the attacks on the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo in Paris, it became known that Saïd Kouachi, who, together with his brother, Chérif, carried out this action, had received training in Yemen.

Qassem al-Raymi, 41, was one of the organization's few emirs whose background predates the September 2001 attacks, having received his baptism of fire as a very young man in Afghanistan.

The execution of al-Raymi could be considered revenge for the attack last December 10 at the Naval Air Base in Pensacola, Florida, of which al-Raymi claimed the planning, in which a cadet of Saudi origin from aviation school, opened fire on a group of soldiers taking part in a mechanics class, killing four US sailors and wounding eight others, before being executed by police.

The action at the Pensacola base led to the expulsion of 21 Saudi cadets, who were detected in their social networks to have fundamentalist and anti-American leanings, and a certain predilection for visiting child pornography pages.

Once the execution of AQAP chief Trump was confirmed, he stated the obvious: "America and its allies are safer as a result of his death. We will continue to protect the American people by tracking down and eliminating terrorists who seek to harm us."

Another war in Afghanistan

The deep wound that was opened to Iran, with the assassination of General Suleimani,

the United States, you know, will never close, so you should be careful to wait for more acts of revenge against it, which can cause enough damage, enough so that the November elections are not a triumphal walk for the current president. Perhaps it is Afghanistan, the best scenario for it, (See: Afghanistan, a neutral space for the Iranian-American war.) So from now on in Afghanistan, which has a border of almost a thousand kilometers, with Iran and where they can filter hundreds of commandos from Tehran, to strike at the different units of the United States, located in Afghan territory and either withdraw to their border or disguise themselves not only by using the abruptness of the country's territory or by using the cover that the Taliban, with whom, beyond the religious and ethical abysses that separate them, forced by the overwhelming North American presence, the Afghan rigorists and the Iranian military, had to create some type of alliance, forgetting that in the 1990s Tehran was at the verge of starting a war with the Taliban regime for its attacks on the Shia community. Today that alliance has undoubtedly been conjured, resulting in the attack that caused the fall of the CIA plane, in which none other than Michael D'Andrea, head of the company's "Iran" section and assassination strategist, traveled. of General Qassem Suleimani (See: Suleimani, a dark day of justice.)

In view of the fact that the operations against the 13,000 North American soldiers that still remain in Afghanistan, not counting the CIA platoons and the contractors (mercenaries) of private firms, may be very possible, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned to Tehran and the Taliban, about how

negative it could be for the mujahideen heirs of Mullah Omar, that alliance in view of the peace talks, which after Trump's abrupt cutoff in September 2019, are being resumed. Now yes, after the clumsiness of having assassinated Soleimani, the withdrawal of the United States becomes more difficult, so as not to leave a free field to Iranian influence.

Although it is no secret to anyone that Iran began a seduction process years ago to get the Taliban to continue operating against the US presence, today the government of the ayatollahs is more entrenched than ever in Afghanistan, with important military contingents such as the Shim Fatemiyoun (Islamic international) liwas (brigades) made up of members of the Afghan Shiite Hazara community, recently returned to Afghanistan after fighting alongside the Syrian government and the Lebanese Hezbollah against Daesh and al-Qaeda and the one that forms tions of Baba Ali Mazari, who since the times of the anti-Soviet war, despite the fact that its leader died in 1995, has continued his fight against the United States, together with other commanders of the al-Quds force, such as Directorate 06 or the Komitey-e Omour-e Vizheh, (Joint Committee for Special Operations (JSCO)), who would have helped to form the elite Taliban body known as Sara Kheta (Red Unit). To those who, according to US sources, would have provided sniper rifles, laser-guided weapons, night vision goggles, small surveillance drones and communication equipment

A scenario that seems to start a new war in Afghanistan for which only the cruelty of Donald Trump is responsible, willing to do anything for power, all against Iran.

Image Source:

<https://cdnmundo4.img.sputniknews.com/images/106744/86/1067448669.jpg>

Intelligence Oriented Policing Activity (I LP). (End)

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)



Throughout the last three articles that I have brought you, I have gone deeper into the various aspects that cover the ILP in police activity, we have gone through both theoretical and practical dimensions by surveying and learning about models and processes used by both the OSCE as by other Police.

In this last installment, and not because it is the last one, it implies that the subject of the ILP is exhausted, but rather that I simply try to close this initial stage, we will see in detail three models that I have selected from the OSCE report, the first one will be the model of the Police of the Republic of Serbia, which integrated specific legal provisions on ILP into a new Police Law adopted in 2016 which developed a National Manual on ILP for Serbian law enforcement services; then the model of Montenegro, whose National Police outlines the Montenegrin approach to serious and organized crime threat assessments; and finally I leave the ILP model applied in the Community Police.

Republic of Serbia: ILP intelligence and operational structures

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia decided to implement the ILP in Serbia in order to improve law enforcement and bring results in the fight against crime and other security threats to a higher level, as well as to align police work with the standards, structure, quality and terminology of the Police Forces in the developed countries of Europe and the world. In this regard, Serbia adopted a new Police Law in 2016, which defines the ILP and provides instructions on how to apply it in Serbian police practice. In said law, article 34 deals with the "Police Intelligence Model":

"In carrying out police tasks, the Police will apply the intelligence-led policing (ILP) model. Intelligence-based policing is a police work management model based on criminal intelligence. Criminal intelligence is a set of data collected, evaluated, processed and analyzed, as a basis for making informed decisions related to the performance of police tasks. "Decree on the promulgation of the Police Law". PR No. 1, Belgrade, January 28, 2016.

The Serbian Police Law also defines and clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the different police structures and levels in managing key elements of the ILP model, including the development of a Public Security Strategic Assessment, as well as strategic and operational plans, which define the priorities and objectives of police work, based on the strategic evaluation(1).

Following an in-depth study of the developed ILP models, such as the UK, US, Canadian, Australian and Swedish models, the Ministry of the Interior developed a Serbian ILP model, which is fully tailored to the specificities of the police system in the Republic. from Serbia. The Serbian ILP model is described in the Serbian National ILP Manual(2) and includes the following chapters:

- Structure of the ILP model in the Republic of Serbia
- Leadership and management at strategic and operational levels
- The criminal intelligence process and practices
- Criminal intelligence work (planning, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of intelligence)
- Planning of operational police work (executive)
- Security and the ILP model
- Employees and Units responsible for Criminal Intelligence Affairs
- Staff development and training.
- Information and communication systems.

In the Serbian Manual, the term "intelligence-based policing" refers to a system and methodology for managing criminal intelligence and planned operational policing, where intelligence is the basis for defining priorities, strategic objectives and operations in the prevention and suppression of crime. and other security threats. It is also the basis for making appropriate decisions about the work and actions of the operational police, the rational participation of available human resources, and the allocation of material and technical resources.

The Serbian Ministry of the Interior is currently implementing the ILP model in police practices in Serbia. The Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency have been supporting the Serbian Police in the implementation process from the beginning. To design the described Serbian ILP model, a gap analysis was carried out to identify concrete activities to be carried out in the areas of legal framework adjustment, organizational structure, IT and human capacity development. Several regulatory documents related to ILP have been adopted. The Strategic Assessment of Public Safety covering a period of five years and the national SOCTA were adopted. Human resources have also been assigned to implement ILP.

The Serbian ILP is a model designed to manage all police work, not just police work, focusing on the prevention and suppression of organized crime.

The necessary conditions for the effective functioning of the ILP model, according to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Serbian ILP Manual are:

1. Management and Leadership: This is a key function of the model that is established at a strategic and operational level and is carried out in accordance with an established methodology and accountability system.
2. Systematized criminal intelligence process: the complete criminal intelligence process in practice must be structured in sub-processes (tasks), functions and activities that are interconnected or carried out at the same time.
3. Effective Organizational Structure: Organizational units and subunits that engage in criminal intelligence and operational policing are established to be compatible with defined processes and functions (similar processes and functions are performed within the same organizational units).
4. Data and information sources: All available open and closed sources must be identified and used efficiently in order to collect data and information.
5. Focus on the most difficult security problems: Priority should be given to organized crime, corruption and other perpetrators and serious crimes (organizers and executors).
6. Criminal intelligence products: in accordance with the methodology defined for the performance of criminal intelligence work and the defined quality criteria, the Criminal Intelligence Affairs Unit produces criminal intelligence products, which are a prerequisite to adequately define the objectives, determine priorities and make decisions. for police work.
7. Legal framework: An adequate legal framework must be defined so that the ILP can operate successfully.
8. Human Resources: Police officers must be specially selected (according to special criteria and procedures) and trained in the performance of criminal intelligence work.
9. Technical resources: developed databases and information technology, adequate facilities, technical equipment and tools are necessary elements of the ILP model.
10. Time as a resource: It takes time and patience to change the organizational culture and the way of working.

As shown in Figure 1, the ILP implementation process consists of three threads, which represent the flow of activities in the form of the number eight. These threads are: (I) direction and leadership (blue); (II) criminal intelligence work (white); and (III) planned operational policing (red). The middle level sub-process, leadership and direction, plays a managerial role (direction and coordination) with respect to the other two sub-processes. First, within the leadership and direction sub-process, the competent Commands initiate (request) the implementation of the criminal intelligence work. Based on your tasks and requests, concrete intelligence activities are planned and carried out, and the results are reported. Secondly, on the basis of this report, the competent Commands make decisions on the implementation of the planned operational police work. Third,

based on these decisions, concrete operational policing activities are planned and carried out, followed by an evaluation report. The described flow of the criminal intelligence process (white) can end after one cycle or repeat (completed with new additions) in several cycles, depending on the success rate of solving a particular crime and other circumstances.




Figura 1 Modelo Serbio de ILP

The organizational structures of the Serbian ILP divide decision-making, leadership, direction and coordination into three levels: National, Regional and Local. In line with ILP principles, each level has its decision-making mechanism based on strategic and operational criminal intelligence products, thus incorporating analysis and assessments into all law enforcement planning and management:

- The Strategic Steering Group (SLG) at the national level in the Police Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is chaired by the Director of the Serbian National Police. Its main roles and responsibilities fall into the following categories: commissioning or requesting a strategic assessment of public safety and other national criminal intelligence products; strategic planning, including decision making and resource allocation, based on strategic assessment and other specific criminal intelligence products; and monitor and verify the implementation of strategic plans.
- The Criminal Police of the National Leading Operational Group (OLG CPG) is chaired by the Chief of Criminal Police, with the following main functions: develop an Annual Operational Plan at the National level for the prevention and repression of crime, based on the strategic plans of SLG; allocate resources for key objectives of the Annual Operating Plan; and tasks/requests and decision-making based on concrete criminal intelligence products in areas of serious and organized crime.
- The main Operational Groups at the Regional level (OLG RPD) are chaired by each of the 27 heads of the regional police directorates, with the following main functions: operational planning at the regional level for the prevention and suppression of crime, based on strategic plans of SLG; assignment and coordination of operational activities at the DPO level; decision-making based on concrete criminal intelligence products at the regional level; and evaluation of completed regional police tasks, operations and investigations.
- The main Operative Groups at the Local / Station level (ORG PS) are composed of the Superior Command of the Police Station and chaired by the Station Commanders. The ORG PS has the following main functions: operational planning at the local/station level for the prevention and repression of crime, based on strategic plans of the SLG, the Annual Operational Plan OLG RPD and criminal intelligence products; decision-making, tasking, and coordination at the local/station level of operational activities, including research.

In addition to being a model for managing operational police work based on criminal intelligence, the ILP model is also intended to integrate quality management. In the Serbian ILP Manual, the term "quality" is emphasized in relation to the ILP process, human resources, training, criminal intelligence products, quality standards and criteria, as well as in relation to the relationship between strategic leadership and operational and management groups, on the one hand, and the analysis service, on the other hand. All of this highlights that quality is recognized as an important characteristic of the ILP model.

Montenegro: Serious Threat and Organized Crime Assessments

Following the recommendations set out in the Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment of Montenegro (SOCTA MNE), a relevant police authority decides on a list of a number of national and inter-agency priorities to combat serious and organized crime. These priorities are reflected in the establishment of specific operational and investigative priority tasks and inter-institutional coordination.

As explained in Figure 2, SOCTA MNE covers the four-year period and is developed by an interagency team composed of representatives from the Montenegrin intelligence and security sector.



Figura 2 SOCTA Desarrollo y planificación estratégica en Montenegro

The 2013-2017 SOCTA MNE priorities include the following areas:

- Serious crimes against life and body generated as a result of conflicts between organized criminal groups;
- Terrorism and religious extremism (3), mainly related to the participation of Montenegrin citizens in the foreign Armed Forces, as well as the strengthening of religious extremism in the area of the Balkan Peninsula;
- High-level corruption committed by people who have the status of public officials;
- Drug trafficking, which is a dominant criminal activity of the largest number of organized criminal groups;
- Usury, which is recognized as a particular problem resulting in the commission of other serious criminal offences;
- Illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, which is characterized by the abuse of the asylum procedure, as well as labor and sexual exploitation; Y
- Money laundering and financial investigations, which is recognized as an effective means in the fight against organized crime.

The National Inter-Agency Task Force (4) is a task force for the fight against organized and serious crime, established in 2015. The Task Force is a multi-agency body, made up of representatives from the following agencies:

- Ministry of Justice
- Police
- National security agency
- Customs
- Department of Public Revenue
- Administration for the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

The Inter-Agency Task Force has the following tasks:

- Propose national priorities in the fight against serious and organized crime;
- Propose strategic objectives and multi-year strategic plans in the fight against serious and organized crime;
- Propose a national intelligence model to prioritize, manage and assign tasks to address serious and organized crime based on the SOCTA MNE;
- Adopt and implement annual operational plans in the fight against serious and organized crime, based on established strategic priorities;
- Ensuring inter-agency cooperation to carry out particular activities at the operational level in the fight against serious and organized crime;
- Consider measures for the efficient implementation of the National Intelligence Model in the establishment of priorities, management and assignment of tasks based on the EMN SOCTA;
- Submit quarterly reports on their work to the Office of Operational Coordination; Y
- Carry out other tasks to direct activities in the fight against serious and organized crime.

Montenegro has slightly modified the Canadian RCMP Sleipnir assessment methodology, which is being used to assess threats from identified organized criminal groups and to compare threat rankings between groups, as well as to identify intelligence gaps that need to be filled. The modified Montenegrin version of the Sleipnir model includes 14 threat criteria subject to evaluation.

Closing ideas with the ILP and Community Police

Community policing focuses on collective problem solving, crime prevention and building trust between the Police and the Communities they serve. Community Policing (CP) practices and principles help establish and strengthen partnerships between police and the public, where police, government agencies and local communities actively cooperate to solve problems together and address community complaints (5). The community policing movement is anchored in the notion that greater community participation will improve police operations and organizational performance, as well as police legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

The specific focus of community policing is to increase and improve relations between the community and the police, and involves a fundamental shift towards identifying local crime and disorder problems jointly with the police and, where possible, jointly addressing and resolving them. . It is based on the belief that a more coordinated and collaborative approach can address current problems and prevent future ones. This approach also implies working in a more multidisciplinary way and with the possibility that other partners, including Municipal Governments, other Government Agencies or Departments or Community Associations, participate in a program.

Community policing can also lead to better and more reliable communications with and from the public. Although PC officers should not be tasked with gathering intelligence, increased trust can represent an invaluable source of information and community awareness for police. This has the potential to become valuable information for police to plan and target their operations against crime and serious crime, including terrorism more effectively, and thus the PC and ILP directly support each other.

The PC has sought to broaden police mandates from a narrow crime-fighting and investigative focus to one that engages more directly with the community to generate community views and concerns often on a wide range of issues: they include fear of crime, crime prevention, disorder and other social and neighborhood problems. The core principles reflected in PC include a more service-oriented approach, built around the themes of 'visibility', 'accessibility' and 'familiarity', with a particular focus on collective problem solving (6). It also provides the means by which the police are able to engage more effectively with the public, and identify and resolve those problems that are public priorities (7).

According to the key principles of PC, the police must:

- engage, mobilize and partner with communities;
- listen to the concerns of communities;
- engage in joint problem solving with the community;
- be visible and accessible to the public;
- know the public and be known by them;
- respond to the needs of communities;
- respect and protect the rights of all members of the community; Y
- be responsible for their actions and the result of these actions (8).

As we have seen at the start of this saga, ILP was developed to challenge the traditional, dominant, response-based surveillance model. The ILP is a top-down managerial decision-making framework and approach, and has implications for both the organization of the police and their operation. Organizationally, unlike the PC, which

gives individual police officers considerable freedom to develop their relationships with local communities, the ILP is necessarily more centralized. Systematic collection and analysis of data and information provide the basis for informed management decisions.

The ILP and the PC are complementary and mutually supportive approaches that still have some different characteristics with respect to their orientation, hierarchical approach and the actors that make decisions, described in the Table that we see below where the comparison of the key dimensions is seen community policing and intelligence-led policing

	POLICÍA COMUNITARIA (PC)	ACTIVIDAD POLICIAL ORIENTADA POR LA INTELIGENCIA (ILP)
¿ORIENTACIÓN?	Comunicad local y vecinos	Grupos criminales, delincuentes prolíficos y graves, contra terrorismo, VERLT
¿ENFOQUE JERÁRQUICO?	De abajo hacia arriba	De arriba hacia abajo
¿QUIÉN DETERMINA LAS PRIORIDADES?	Preocupaciones y demandas de la comunidad	Los encargados de formular políticas y la gestión policial a partir del análisis de inteligencia criminal

The criteria for success and the expected benefits of both approaches are similar, with the aim of:

- Greater police effectiveness based on a greater flow of information;
- Increased safety and security of the community, resulting in greater public satisfaction.

Intelligence gathering should never be the primary goal of community policing, but can be a by-product of effective PC. By complementing and supporting ILP, community policing can facilitate the exchange of information between the public and the police by building public trust in the police and increasing the number of opportunities for interaction between the public and the police.

In turn, coordination efforts and ILP tasks can strengthen the effects of community policing through information analysis processes and their hierarchical structures. The more positive nature of the police-citizen relationship now promotes a more continuous and reliable transfer of information from one to another.

“The PC has built skills in many law enforcement officers that directly support ILP’s new responsibilities: the scientific approach to problem solving, environmental scanning, effective communications with the public, fear reduction and mobilization of the public. community to deal with problems are among the important attributes that PC brings to this challenge (9)”.

Therefore, there is potential for community policing efforts to serve as a local information gateway to prevent and target all forms of crime, including violent extremism and terrorism. At the same time, ILP can help community officials more effectively identify, prioritize, and address public interest issues.

“The neighborhood police should act to generate information and that information should be incorporated and help drive the process of the National Intelligence Model. The guidance has drawn attention to how information can be generated from communities in different ways. This may include comments from members of the public; information obtained by officers in the exercise of their functions within neighborhoods and information derived from other public sector workers, such as teachers and doctors. Doing so is supposed to increase awareness of risk and vulnerability; improve opportunities for community involvement; and increase community confidence. Additionally, as we have seen, one of the goals of neighborhood policing has been to proactively identify and address crime problems that are priorities for local communities. Police officers must view these priorities as “intelligence” and incorporate them into the National Intelligence Model systems.” – Bullock (2013: 128-131).

The approach provided by the use of ILP is broad spectrum, as we see both in the use of the actions carried out by the Community Police, up to the strategic and national levels used by the United Kingdom among others, not only the European Community benefits from the use of this Intelligence model, but as we see other non-member States also apply its bases, not being the United States of America an exception, since its police also echo the ILP.

It is certainly a standardized and proven tool that, applied correctly and adjusted to the local needs of each country, brings satisfactory results in the fight against criminal activity. As always, the weakest link that must be worked on is the staff, so constant training and retraining, together with strict management controls, are necessary pillars to guarantee the achievement of acceptable achievements.

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2020

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de 63 países
65,9% son internacionales
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98,721
Asistencia total
(expositores, visitantes,
prensa, organizadores)

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Delegaciones oficiales
de 94 países
y 4 organizaciones
(en representación de 760 delegados)

696
periodistas
de 44 países

75 Conferencias
2 102 Reuniones de negocios realizadas



Mozambique, a mark of blood

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

The almost 2.5 million inhabitants of the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado, a Muslim majority, some 2,600 kilometers north of Maputo, the country's capital, do not come out of their daze, few of them understand the reasons why since 2017, their lives have been irreversibly changed, although they all suffer the consequences of being targeted by Wahhabi extremism.

For three years a radical formation, popularly known as al-Shabbab, by comparison with the terrorist group that has been operating in Somalia since 2006, since the real name of the Mozambican gang is Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah or ASWJ (Followers of the prophetic), without links with the Somali mujahideen, since these are tributaries of al-Qaeda, while the Mozambicans would have sworn allegiance to Daesh, an issue that is not fully clarified either, since until now they have not made public any statement regarding their ideology and its objectives nor does the global Daesh seem to have recognized them, as members of its "exclusive club". Although in an unclear statement, Daesh speaks of its new willat in Central Africa, which would include Mozambican rebels and those from the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Despite the fact that a strong censorship imposed by the provincial authorities makes it difficult to evaluate the real situation of the crisis in the northern province, the epicenter of the terrorist actions. Since its eruption, the coastal areas have been the most affected, where most of the 300 registered attacks have taken place, in which some 700 people have died, while close to 100,000 have been forced to move to urban areas, within from the same province as Isla Ibo, Mocimba de Praia, Macomia and Pemba, the capital of the province, where serious location problems are beginning to occur. These refugees arrive in many cases injured, with



malaria, infectious diseases and malnutrition for which the few health centers are overwhelmed.

The government of President Filipe Nyusde, who has just assumed his second five-year term last January, after winning the October elections, insists on not recognizing the crisis, has refused to set up refugee camps and take charge of his maintenance, which is why, as in the city of Macomia, it is common for more than four families to be crowded into a single house. These refugees must also go unnoticed in front of the local inhabitants, for fear that coming from the conflict zones they will be stigmatized as terrorists. At the same time, the United Nations agencies, excusing themselves from the lack of resources, do not assume their responsibilities in providing a humanitarian response either.

In recent months, the region has not only suffered from an increase in terrorist actions, but has also suffered from the impact of Cyclone Kenneth, which devastated northern Mozambique between April 21 and 29 of last year, which was considered the violent that has ever hit the continent, since records have existed.

The combination of both phenomena has unleashed a strong economic crisis in Cabo Delgado, one of the poorest provinces in the country, with high rates of unemployment and illiteracy and the lowest social indices in the country, it is usually called "Cabo Esquecido" (forgotten).

It is still not clear, nor who they are, nor how the terrorist group is structured, which is believed to be made up of some 3 thousand men, that beyond its irruption in 2017, (See: Mozambique: The country of the Kalashnikov) in these recent months its actions have begun to intensify. Last November, 31 attacks were recorded, making it the most violent month since the insurgency began.

Terrorist operations are constantly taking place against buses, taking over villages, ambushes against military targets deployed in the region in an attempt to stop the insurgent wave, which also affects Christian missionaries, international aid groups and special international companies. -mainly oil and gas companies and their mostly foreign workers that operate in the region, such as Exxon-Mobil and the French oil company Total, which seek to exploit the large reserves of

liquid natural gas, the third largest in the world, discovered off the coast of Cabo Delgado in 2010.

Various government delegations were also attacked in different cities of the province, such as in Mocímboa da Praia, with nearly 30,000 inhabitants, where they not only attacked public offices, despite the fact that they were protected by army troops, but also took over the city for a short time.

At the beginning of this year a minibus with about twenty passengers, traveling on a route from the Macomia district and heading to Pemba, was attacked and set on fire by ASWJ militiamen. Although the local authorities did not confirm the details, different versions differ that the dead would have been between four and ten, some of them decapitated, while several women were kidnapped. Almost a month earlier, on December 6, a military convoy from the Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique.) or FADM, was ambushed near the town of Narere, killing between nine and 14 soldiers. and three vehicles.

This has generated great fear in the troops, who refuse to carry out night patrols in this area, for fear of ambushes and the increasingly frequent use of IEDs (improvised explosive devices).

The elements of the shipwreck

The province of Cabo Delgado is an extremely rich region, beyond the recent start-up of hydrocarbon exploitations, it also has rubies, wood and gold exploitations, which, as is common in many regions of the world, does not result in the benefit of its inhabitants. In many cases, in order to survive, they must dedicate themselves to the illegal trade in ivory and drugs, particularly heroin, which passes through Cabo Delgado and is one of Mozambique's largest exports. In addition to the smuggling of precious stones, hunting and illegal trafficking of wild animals. What has given the creation of important criminal networks and cartels almost always managed by political elites.

Therefore, the brilliant appearance of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah, allows us to suspect a certain masking of clearly criminal activities, although his actions such as beheadings could indicate a typical complement of rigorous groups.

Last October the Ministry of Defense announced the neutralization of a large number of criminals, by the FADM, who would be fighting near the border with Tanzania. According to different sources in that same sector, the presence of "white soldiers" patrolling alongside the FADM, who would belong to the Russian private

security company Wagner, which deployed some 200 contractors (mercenaries) in the African country, had been confirmed. Despite launching several operations and hitting the insurgents, not only did they not reach their objective, but the Russians would have suffered a significant number of casualties.

According to the versions that insist on the ASWJ belonging to Daesh, they point to the existence of links with radical imams from Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Algeria, where some clerics from Cabo Delgado completed their religious training. Campaigns to recruit militants in circles close to mosques and madrassas are also mentioned, with promises of monthly salaries and other material benefits, given that the region's economic problems encourage the formation of extremist groups and the incorporation of young people without other perspectives, a phenomenon that Wahhabi terrorism uses in all the countries in which it operates.


Mozambique has lived through a long civil war between 1976-1992, which has left one million three hundred thousand dead, almost two million refugees outside the country and 500 thousand internally displaced persons, a blood mark much easier to revive than to erase.

Image Source:

<https://www.sawaexpeditions.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/img-mapa-mozambique.jpg>

Pakistan: The winding road to justice

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Hafiz Muhammad Saeed

The Lahore city anti-terrorism high court on Wednesday, February 12, convicted Pakistani hardline Islamist cleric Hafiz Muhammad Saeed to eleven years in prison, along with his deputy Malik Zafar Iqbal.

The trial aims to condemn the links and financing of terrorist operations, in addition to owning a significant number of properties linked to organizations declared illegal on February 21, 2019, by the Pakistani National Security Committee (NSC), through the Anti-Terrorist Law, 1997, as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa or JuD, (Society of Preaching), also known as Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT (Army of the Pure), an armed group that operates mainly in the disputed region of Kashmir since 1990 and the religious society Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad or MDwl (Centre for Preaching and Guidance) and its charity wing Falah-i-Insaniat (FIF).

Saeed, who has already announced that he will appeal the verdict, if he stands firm, he will

actually serve only five and a half years since the two sentences will be served simultaneously. In the same trial, 67 other heads of these organizations, investigated by the Department for the Fight against Terrorism, received different sentences.

Beyond the trial and convictions, the court was unable to establish that Saeed had participated in the operation against the city of Mumbai in 2008, when Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos carried out attacks against different targets in the city, the largest in India, with about twenty million inhabitants. In those days, 160 people were assassinated, including six Americans, for which Washington offered 10 million dollars for their capture or specific data that lead to it, while New Delhi considers him the main ideologue of that action.

The arrest of the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, occurred on Wednesday, July 17 last year, when he was traveling through some point of the 97 kilometers that separate

the city of Lahore, from the city of Gujranwala, in the province of Punjab, just a few days before the Prime Minister, Imran Khan, traveled to Washington to meet with President Donald Trump, who will undoubtedly have considered the opportune arrest of the religious leader as a personal tribute. Saeed has since been held in Lahore Central Prison, Kot Lakhpat in Lahore.

After Saeed's arrest, the trial was instructed at the speed of light, in times of the Pakistani bureaucracy, so that it began in December, and could take place in just months, a true miracle for the system court of Pakistan.

Emir Saeed, for years, remained free apparently protected by the Pakistani intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). There are strong suspicions that the "partnership" between Saeed and the ISI are responsible for the continuous attacks that, with the cover of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, carry out almost constant attacks and

attacks in Indian Kashmir, as it has recognized, at the time, the then president of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf. At the same time, it has been known that Hameed Gul, the former head of the ISI, directed a conglomerate of fundamentalist groups and the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Defense of Pakistan), an organization that encompasses more than forty political parties and extremist religious groups that was under the direction of Saeed. Many of these groups, particularly Lashkar-e-Taiba, have been declared a terrorist organization in June 2014 by the United States.

Although he was never charged with any specific crime, after which he was released, until in 2009 he was brought to trial accused of the same charges charged to other members of LeT, but in the end, he was also acquitted. Many have distrusted that sentence, while some local jurists and journalists insist that the court had yielded to pressure and threats from the security forces and the terrorist organization itself.

The Saeed-ISI "partnership" is the fundamental reason why Pakistan is subjected to intense international pressure, their arrest came just three months before the scheduled review by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), the international watchdog of financing of terrorism and money laundering, based in Paris, which in June 2018, placed Pakistan on the "grey list", of nations that protect terrorism, since since 2005, the country was suffering from increasing international isolation, not only because of its economic decline, but also because of its protection from terrorism, which coincidentally a few days after Saeed's conviction was known, would cause Pakistan to enter the "black list" of "non-cooperative" countries with the FATF, to curb the financing of terrorism. Trying to reverse that fate, the Pakistani authorities began a campaign that lasted for months, arresting dozens of suspects of belonging to or having links with terrorist organizations, while seizing hundreds of properties linked to prohibited groups, where mosques,

madrassas, and societies run by Wahhabi clerics.

Hafiz Saeed, who in December 2018 promised to start a war for the former Mongol principality of Hyderabad Deccan, which existed in India between 1724 and 1956, now divided between the states of Telangana, Karnataka and Maharashtra, opening a new source of tension between India and Pakistan. Saeed, since the attacks of September 11 in New York, has been arrested on several occasions suspected of planning the attack on December 13, 2001 against the Indian parliament, in New Delhi, which left 15 dead and twenty wounded. Saeed was also placed under house arrest, during his acquittal trial, for the attacks on trains in Mumbai on July 11, 2006, when seven coordinated explosions on five moving trains and two rush-hour stations went off. with a difference of fifteen minutes each, they caused almost two hundred dead and eight hundred wounded. The objective had been very well thought out when it came to generating a real carnage, since the Mumbai railway system is one of the most complex in the world, transporting eight million passengers a day. A Mumbai court ultimately sentenced five of the captured perpetrators to death, while seven others were sentenced to life in prison.

The big act

Hafiz Muhammad Saeed began his long career as a terrorist leader and ideologue in the early 1980s in the heat of the anti-Soviet war being waged in Afghanistan. His radicalization would come through his trip to Saudi Arabia in the late seventies, where he would pursue Islamic higher studies where he met Saudi leaders who were already participating in the Afghan war. Already returned to Pakistan together with the Palestinian scholar Abdullah Uzzam, he would found the preaching group Jamaat-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad, at the time that a major armed rebellion began in India against New Delhi, claiming Pakistani rights over Kashmir, whose organizers fueled this

escalation after the defeat of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The new outbreak in Kashmir, where veteran fighters from the war in Afghanistan were arriving, seemed to predict a victory over India, which never came.

But without a doubt, of all the actions attributed to Saeed, the attacks against different targets in Mumbai have been the most mediatic, given their spectacular nature.

Between November 26 and 29 of that year, some fifteen mujahideen, with great military training and no more than thirty years of age, linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba or Kashmiri Jaish-e-Muhammad (Muhammad's army) Arriving to Mumbai, from the state of Gujarat, by sea in two boats, from where they then boarded several rubber boats to reach the beaches, from where they spread out through the crowded streets of South Mumbai, the country's financial capital, to carry out a dozen coordinated operations, against specific civilian targets: which not only froze the city but all of India.

The first attacks around nine o'clock at night begin to take place in the always crowded train station, Chhatrapani Shivaji, the Cama & Albless hospital, and the Leopold cafe frequented by tourists and executives, some of whom were taken hostage, in addition to the Chabad-Lubavitch Hasidic Jewish center. While the bulk of the attackers went to the five star hotels, Oberoi Trident and the emblematic Taj Mahal Palace & Tower; where they resisted, with a significant number of hostages, for almost two days, the siege of the marine commandos, who were surprised by the high level of instruction and the quality and quantity of weapons. The hotel attackers selected their victims from among the British and American guests, who were promptly executed. Of the nearly 200 dead, 25 were foreigners, while the vast majority of those killed were apparently Indian nationals.

Faced with the devastating panorama presented by the city, the Indian authorities demonstrated a

significant lack of preparation to face such a crisis, later it was also revealed that six months earlier, the Indian intelligence services had warned of the possibility that produced an attack on Bombay from the sea, a warning that no one paid attention to. Pakistani intelligence documents were found in the backpack of one of the attackers, a version as difficult to follow as the winding path of justice, which unfolds between Pakistan and India. Some versions indicate that ten of the fifteen attackers had been personally trained by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, while classified

Image Source:

<https://www.theminoritytimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Hafiz-Saeed-pic.jpg>

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Articulation of the Municipal PISCC as a regional security strategy in Antioquia

By Julián David Urrego Atehortúa (Colombia)



Departmental Administrative Center - CAD, headquarters of the government of Antioquia.

In this 2020 the new government of the department of Antioquia begins, as well as that of its different municipalities, bringing as a consequence new security strategy that will be materialized in the different comprehensive plans for citizen security and coexistence - PISCC- of the aforementioned territorial entities.

Then comes a great objective for the department and that is to guarantee public order, coexistence and citizen security in its different categories -safety, tranquility, environment, public health- a goal before which it cannot be inferior and for which it has to be taken into account that, just as criminal structures constantly mutate and transform, security must also do so in order to generate the tranquility and social peace that all citizens require.

During the previous four years 2016-2019, in regions such as the northeast and middle Magdalena, the clan of the gulf used a strategy

of "exchanging tokens" by virtue of which, when the public force was very close to the trail of someone of the members of this structure, they were immediately "transferred" to other municipalities where they continued with their criminal work without losing their work style and having their functions within the clan very clear.

This, consequently, put the municipalities at a disadvantage in their struggle to maintain security, because when they already had an organizational chart and identified modus operandi, the alleged criminals moved to another place outside the jurisdiction, and there came the huge mistake of many of them, because they disregarded this or that person without taking into account that this person had simply been changed and in his place another continued in the same point the criminal activities of the previous one, even many times those who move-daban ended up operating and facilitating the clan's

criminal activities from places near their place of origin.

In this order of ideas, it is up to the Government of Antioquia to take note of the experience gathered during these four previous years and to confront these organized armed groups -GAO- by resorting to the strategy of the monthly regional security councils, by virtue of which the actions of the criminal structures of the regions and municipalities should be socialized, creating organization charts of the same, which are constantly socialized and especially coordinating some activities of the annual investment operational plans that serve and obey regional strategies.

In this way, the departmental government secretariat should be a kind of beacon that serves as a guide, not only in the creation of the municipal PISCC but also in the execution of the different POAIs, so that, through a coordinated strategy, nothing, the new municipal leaders think about the development of their

regions and not in their specific local territories.

In the same sense, the different mayors cannot be inferior to this challenge and return to the same mistake they have made for years, and that is to think only of their territories and wear down the districts and the Police Department of Antioquia asking for more and more police officers who will not

arrive due to the lack of personnel in the institution and; especially because security is not only guaranteed with numbers of troops patrolling the streets, but also with an excellent coordination of all the actors that have to do with the issue, from the departmental level to the local level.

Therefore, since it is a new start for the local and departmental


governments, special attention should be paid to the aforementioned, because while each municipality is thinking about its PISCC, the criminal structures already have a whole regional scaffolding going and our department cannot be inferior to this upcoming security challenge.

Photo by Douglas Hernandez

Julian David Urrego Atehortua
(Colombia) Lawyer.

Sahel: The danger of the Taliban effect

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Sahel region in the north of the African continent.

The war that has been waged in the north of Mali, since 2012 and which began as a "simple" Tuareg revolt, one more than periodic with which they try to claim their ancestral rights over the Azawad region, not only extends in time, but it adds square kilometers and victims almost at the same speed.

Thousands of dead and wounded, and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, have so far been the only results produced by the Western intervention and particularly that of France, which with the Barkhane operation, has deployed in that territory, a region larger than the entire area of the European Union, about 4,500 men, which already adds up to about 50 casualties. A number too high, for the low patience of the French electorate.

When the crisis broke out, it was practically circumscribed to a sector of northern Mali, now the stain forms an arc, which covers the entire north of that country, the north of Burkina Faso, Niger and with increasingly frequent tails in

Chad, and while in the Nampala area (Mali) -next to the border with Mauritania-, there are several terrorist camps waiting to start operating in that country, which has not registered terrorist attacks since 2011.

The attack in Inates (Niger) last December, in which 74 Nigerien soldiers died (See: Sahel: Terrorism, a reason to survive.) is confirmation that the entire region has been turned on and no longer exists even for France, nor for its partners in the European Union and the United States, which already operates openly in Niger, more than two exits.

That of withdrawing humiliated, with the symbolic charge that this can represent in French internal politics, which would leave President Emanuel Macron mortally wounded, but what is really dangerous is the very high risk of generating the same effect as the triumph of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, about the Red Army, in the early 1990s.

That victory, achieved thanks to the enormous efforts of the United States, together with an anti-communist entente that included countries such as Egypt, Turkey, China, Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Kingdom, France and a long etcetera, shot hundreds of thousands of young Muslims, who flirted with the most extreme aspects of Islam, thanks to the indoctrination received in the thousands of mosques and madrassas, financed by Saudi Arabia throughout the Muslim world and many large Western cities, to launch into what they and its doctrinaires called *jihad*, a term that goes much further than what we in the West lower to the category of "holy war." With them and veterans of the Afghan war, to which thousands of volunteers had arrived, and not so much, to fight, in the first great Islamic war, practically since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, finding a way to compensate their peoples and their God, from the humiliation and submission to which they were

taken by the Christian and Catholic empires.

Many of those veterans, with the usual financiers Washington and Riyadh, opened fronts in Chechnya, Kosovo and Algeria and launched operations in Egypt, the Philippines, among other nations where the waves of what we could call "the Taliban effect" reached and that it is verified in the many wars that shake the Islamic world today, in which thousands of veterans of Afghanistan and also forged on the other fronts, driven by fanaticism in many cases and the lack of expectations and incentives, enroll in movements linked to the -Qaeda and Daesh, launched into everything, when they have nothing to lose.

Such is the case of the Sahel, where thousands of mujahideen not only participate, but, in light of the results after eight years of war, and know that Western armies cannot control them and that, with better preparation, pay and weapons uncontrollably overwhelm the local forces, which in the best of cases can barely resist their onslaught.

Therefore, so that the "Taliban effect" does not repeat itself, in the Sahel, we are talking about an area larger than Europe, so the West must implement extreme measures. Already this arc of conflict could reach two very active poles in West Africa, Boko Haram, which not only operates in the north of Nigeria, but more and more frequently in Cameroon, (See: Nigeria, the wide trail of terror) and in the east of the continent, in the always critical Somalia, where al-Shabbab strikes from the capital Mogadishu, in the center of the country, and in vast rural areas in the south of the country and even with some frequency in Kenya,

Faced with this reality, the United States and France, the two nations with the greatest military activity in Africa, will have to encourage the rest of their NATO partners and the United Nations to

increase their presence not only by providing huge amounts of weapons, but fundamentally troops to supplant the highly unreliable numbers of local armies, such as the Group Five Sahel (G5S) force made up of men from Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad, who have made virtually no progress

Hesitating about the implementation of urgent and extreme measures in reference to the Sahel would have suicidal connotations for Western interests.

Portrait of a Specter

The crisis is already immeasurable for countries like Burkina Faso, which barely a year ago suffered practically no consequences from the war that was being waged just a few kilometers from its border with Mali. Little by little, the porosity of these borders has allowed militiamen from both the Front Support Group for Islam and Muslims or Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, which responds to al-Qaeda or Daesh in the Great Sahara, to multiply their operations in the provinces of Sum and Udalan, in the north of Burkina Faso, concentrated their attacks essentially on schools, forcing the closure of hundreds of them, together with the defection of their teachers who are the scapegoats of the attackers, and Christian churches where massacres have occurred, since they are attacked in the middle of mass. The latest of these attacks occurred last Sunday, February 16, at a Protestant church in the town of Pansi in Yagha, a volatile province near the border with Niger. Although in recent weeks there have been two explosive attacks against communal markets, where obviously the victims may also be Muslims. This situational framework has caused the displacement of civilians from January 2019 to January 2020 to be 700 thousand

people, it is estimated that 150 thousand in the last three weeks, when before January 2019, the displaced they reached 65 thousand souls. Most of these contingents seek to reach the Malian cities of Anderamboukane and Ménaka. Where there were already almost 8 thousand displaced people from other regions of Mali.

The situation in Niger is no better, where 11,000 inhabitants of rural areas bordering Mali have had to abandon their homes and move to other towns in the south of their country. In camps in the areas near the Nigerien cities of Tillaberi and Tahona, there are about 60,000 Malian refugees and another 82,000 who have arrived from towns in the interior of Niger. In the last week, Mauritania must have received a thousand displaced persons who have arrived from the towns of Segou and Niono, in the central region of Mali.

And as a result of the fact that the terrorists already have camps in Mali very close to the Mauritanian border, the Flintlock (blunderbuss) military exercises that Mauritania has carried out together with the United States since 2005 have increased. This new version of the Flintlock began on Monday the 17th and will run until the 28th, together with some thirty African and European countries, in Atar, the center-west of the country, in Nouakchott and Kaédi (Mauritania) and in the Senegalese city de Thiès, with the assistance of some 1,600 soldiers, with the supervision of the United States Africa Command (Africom).

Despite them and Mike Pompeo's statements that the United States will continue to collaborate with African countries in their fight against terrorism, other versions indicate that this assistance is getting closer to the end every day, which would undoubtedly accelerate absolute "the Taliban effect".

Image Source:

<https://accionhumanitaria.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/sahel4.jpg>

India: The Bastard Gods

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Narendra Modi with Donald Trump in India.

The American president, Donald Trump, on Tuesday, February 25, concluded his first, brief and unpaid visit to India, where more than a glorious and bloody staging of his sidekick Narendra Modi, there were not too many announcements regarding trade, investment and above all in security, an issue in which both heads of state are more than soul mates. The US president managed the sale of 24 Seahawk MH-60R multipurpose helicopters and six AH-64E attack helicopters for the Indian Army and Navy, for some three billion dollars. Trump's business in India, aims to confirm the significant rebound in arms sales to the Asian country that increased its purchases of US products in the field of defense from almost zero in 2008 to a total of almost 23,000 million dollars in 2019.

In any case, Trump intends to further reduce his trade deficit with India, for which he has applied tariffs on steel and aluminum, producing adverse actions in New Delhi's trade policy towards Washington, such as raising tariffs

on agricultural products, and restrictions on US medical products, resulting in the United States withdrawing a decades-old preferential trade program to India.

In the tour that lasted barely 36 hours, punctuated by massive acts in which the Indian Prime Minister and the US president did not skimp on mutual praise, they barely avoided the low-intensity war that both maintain on tariffs and trade deficit. Nor were deep references made to the issue that has been shaking India since December, the controversial

Citizenship Amendment Act or CAA, (See: India, between civil war and genocide), a regulation that will give citizenship to illegal Hindu immigrants, Sikhs, Buddhists and other minority religions originating in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, ostensibly marginalizing millions of Muslims who will not be able to prove that they were born in the country or have been living in it since before December 31, 2014.

The law has provoked innumerable protests throughout India, in which there have been deaths, injuries

and thousands of arrests. The protests have not only included the Muslim minority, some 200 million, which since Modi's arrival in government in 2014 has not ceased to suffer serious restrictions on their freedom, but also thousands of students, militants of political organizations, teachers, human rights activists opposed to Modi's policies, and his far-right Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party) or BJP, which is trying to establish Hindutva, the conception of a society based on the principles of Hinduism. (See: India: A dangerous drift to fundamentalism).

During his visit, Trump told reporters that he had heard about the wave of violence but had not discussed it with the Prime Minister, who treated him to a veritable crowd shower at a rally called Namaste Trump, in Sanskrit) attended by more than 125,000 people, in which the "eminent" visitor was applauded, who reached a cricket stadium in the city of Ahmedabad, Gujarat state, of which Modi was Prime Minister (governor) twelve years. To hide the misery of a

shantytown, the current Prime Minister of Gujarat, ordered the construction of a wall about 500 meters long to hide a slum, in addition to evicting 45 families, in a single day and without prior notice, who lived in shacks, which were well in sight of the presidential entourage.

In his brief stay, as if that were not enough, Trump was taken to see a building very similar to the hotel-casino that he built in the 1990s in Atlantic City, called Trump-Taj Mahal, in addition to bearing multiple tributes to a skinny saint and something naked, known as Mahatma Gandhi.

With this trip, Trump supports a fundamental ally and even more so at this time when India is returning to the Western fold, after decades of flirting with Russia in any of its political forms and when its archenemy Pakistan forms a strategic military and commercial alliance with Russia. China.

Trump avoided referring to the Kashmir issue, the long conflict that has triggered three wars and countless armed clashes between India and Pakistan, for which the North American president, who at some point presented a plan to resolve it, made it clear that he was still willing to offer himself as mediator. The Pakistani army, nuclear-armed like India, was a historical ally of the United States, being a key player in the outcome of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, so there must undoubtedly still be splendid American memories in the coffers of many Pakistani military officers, who might be tempted to get back on the right track and lead them back to Washington.

Waiting for Mr. Marshall

Always the visit of an American president, to any nation full of needs such as India, triggers the same thing that the brilliant Luis García Berlanga portrayed in the legendary "Welcome Mister Marshall", where

the inhabitants of Villar del Río, they await the arrival of the almighty General George Marshall, whom they understood as a Santa Claus in uniform. In this case, Modi may have felt brotherly with the residents of Villar del Río, when he saw *Air Force One* leave the New Delhi airport carrying the ruddy New York thug, without having opened his wallet. Having Modi, after the departure of his friend, to bear the high cost of the visit of his fellow traveler.

A few hours before Trump's arrival in India, there had been seven deaths in different demonstrations in New Delhi, a day and a half later the dead had risen to 29 and the injured to about 300, while the protests continue, so this number you can keep climbing.

Most of the victims did not fall under police repression, but at the hands of Bharatiya Janata Party militants armed with spikes and iron bars, who advance against Muslims protesting against CAA.

Delhi Prime Minister (Governor) Arjind Kerjwal, who has just taken up his second term, called on Modi to deploy army troops to riot-hit areas in the far northeast of the capital city of nearly 22 million people, where all schools remain closed and assemblies are prohibited.

On Tuesday afternoon, some 500 young Hindus occupied the mosque in Ashok Nagar, and after climbing its minaret, they hoisted the saffron flag of Hinduism or the god Hanuman (The one with the jaw), revered as the monkey god considered part of of Shiva, then set fire to the mosque. Then another smaller one and several Muslim shops in the neighborhood market.

While other Muslim neighborhoods in Delhi, such as Chand Bagh, Bhajanpura, Gokulpuri, Maujpur, Kardampuri and Jaffrabad, continue to be attacked by Hindu protesters, distinguished by the tilak, a saffron-colored sacramental stripe painted

on their foreheads, shouting "Jai Shri Ram" (Glory to Ram), a central figure in Hindu mythology, looting and burning houses, shops, civilian vehicles and it has even been reported that several ambulances, gas stations, even a hospital and different mazar (shrines) were burned.) Islamic. Muslim families continue to congregate in mosques, seeking safety, which could lead to large-scale attacks and subsequent carnage, which would go far beyond what Modi can hide.

According to the first autopsies carried out, the reports reveal that the victims have been killed with firearms, while the wounded, admitted to the different hospitals, also have gunshot wounds, white weapons and injuries caused by jumping from heights tried to escape lynching. Among the police there have also been casualties, an officer was killed after being hit with a stone and eleven others were injured when they tried to separate Hindus and Muslims, who were facing each other in a street.

There are several complaints that the police, in many cases, not only do not intervene to stop the Hindu gangs, but also operate with them against the Muslims, brandishing against them their famous lathi, canes of almost one meter seventy, dragees of the British colonialism. Nor has the presence of the RAF or Rapid Action Force been seen, anti-riot units that, despite the fact that the riots have been going on for a long time, have not been deployed.

Religious violence in the streets where, until very recently, both communities celebrated together the two most important festivals of both religions: the culmination of Ramadan or Eid al-Fitr and Diwali (Feast of Lights), the beginning of the new year Hindu, has made those same neighbors kill each other, in the name of bastard gods, which is much more like Ram or Allah than Trump and Modi.

Image Source:

https://www.dw.com/image/50574813_303.jpg



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Afghanistan: Agreement or Safe Conduct for Trump?

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Signing of the peace agreement between the United States government and the Taliban. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, leader of the Taliban delegation; and Zalmay Khalilzad, US envoy (REUTERS / Ibraheem al Omari)

Finally, the United States reached a peace agreement with the Taliban, after a very long and convulsive year of meetings in Qatar and almost twenty years of war. In a protocol ceremony held in Doha, the Qatari capital, on Saturday, February 29, with the presence of the North American Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and the second in command of the insurgent organization, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, which in speeches for the occasion addressed a significant number of representatives of foreign governments such as Norway, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Russia, Indonesia and other neighboring nations that gave framework, to an agreement of extreme difficulty to fulfill.

On September 9 of last year, peace was as close as it is now,

although Trump canceled the agreement that would be signed at Camp David, after an attack that cost the life of an American soldier, but they resumed again in November, until that on February 13 everything seemed ready for the signature of Trump's envoys and Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada.

This end to one of the most devastating wars and the longest that the United States has waged in its history does not cease to arouse many doubts for observers and fundamentally for the government in Kabul. Two clear reasons reinforce the real motivations why the United States has finally finalized said agreement, which could be masking a new Vietnam-style defeat for Washington, since the Taliban describe the event as a resounding "victory", while no one contradicts them; At the same time, there was

no presence of the Kabul government or any other Afghan except the Taliban throughout the Doha talks, which began in September 2018, so many fear that the United States could use the agreement as a cover to abandon their fate not only the government of President Ashraf Ghani, but also the entire political class, the army and the security forces created under the influence of the United States and millions of Afghan citizens who among themselves They chose the North American side, which today could be using the Doha agreement as a simple safe-conduct, so as not to accept defeat, much less nine months before a presidential election in which, until today, an invincible Donald Trump is risking his re-election.

From now on, the United States undertakes within fourteen months

to leave the Afghan territory, which it invaded in 2001, gradually withdrawing all of its 12,000 troops. The agreement indicates that in the next four months some 8,500 men will have to be withdrawn, practically all of the forces that President Barack Obama had left at the end of his government in January 2016, which proves Trump's failure. The United States must also close five of the bases it maintains in the Central Asian country. The deadlines stipulate that by mid-2021 all the military forces of the United States and those of the rest of its allies - fundamentally European-, will have been withdrawn, which has been the permanent demand of the Taliban, although it is believed that Washington would maintain a significant endowment of intelligence agents, to monitor progress in the war against Daesh Khorasan and al-Qaeda, on the ground, in which the Taliban must take part.

In addition, the agreement promotes inter-Afghan talks, which until now had been practically non-existent between the political power in Kabul headed by President Ghani and the insurgent gang, which has always considered the political class of their country as puppets of the Americans. .

The talks that will begin on March 10, have among several very conflicting points to resolve the exchange of prisoners, which is the most urgent and the most difficult since the difference in prisoners by side is very noticeable. Kabul keeps some 5,000 mujahideen in its jails, while the Taliban has only a few thousand. The discussion will focus on that point, since on Sunday, March 1, President Ghani declared that: "The government of Afghanistan has not committed to releasing the 5,000." A decision that is not lacking in logic, if one takes into account that in fact the war is

still active and it would not be surprising if it intensifies as the United States withdraws.

The Taliban, for its part, with this ceasefire, in search of a definitive peace, could really know how much loyalty its bases have to the leadership, which is preventing them with this decision from the possibility of an indisputable victory, after twenty years of war, countless sacrifices and thousands of brothers killed in combat and torture. How many of the mid-level commanders of the Taliban, who are taking the course of a war in which they do not stop making progress, will agree to the signing of this agreement, how difficult, but it could produce a seismic event in the force commanded by the Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada at the head of the organization since 2016, after the death of Mullah Akhtar Mansour, hit by an American drone, in Dhal Bandin, near the city of Queta, capital of Pakistani Baluchistan.

A gorge too narrow

We know that the Afghan geography is made up of mountain ranges, valleys and gorges, sometimes too narrow for peace to cross them, without collapsing as usual. And as has been the case for more than forty years, the end of one war leads nowhere else than to the start of another.

The majority of the 36 million Afghans are under the age of thirty, so none of them have lived a single day of their lives in peace and if it is confirmed that the United States has managed to escape this war, without paying the political cost, Afghanistan will precipitate a new warlike collapse. The Taliban, from social networks do nothing more than announce their victory, which confirms the worst of theories. And the critical point of this agreement, where all the scaffolding erected in

Doha, can collapse is in the 5 thousand Taliban prisoners, who according to Democratic Senator Tom Malinowski, according to the agreement yes or yes they must be released.

For its part, the political power of Kabul, rather than revising the Doha agreement, is focused on the discussion about who won the presidential elections last year, the current president or the executive president and Ghani's archenemy, Abdullah-Abdullah, as if ignoring the old antecedents of the country such as the fate of Mohammad Najibullah, brutally tortured and finally executed by the Taliban in 1996.

Although the only danger is not the Taliban, according to a Khorasan Daesh commander, the peace deal will be to their advantage, as there are many Taliban troops who have promised to join Daesh if the deal is finally implemented.

In a show of goodwill, on February 22, the United States and the Taliban began a voluntary reduction of operations for seven days, which has been achieved, without knowing what will happen once the term expires.

In any case, peace or safe conduct are too far away for important players in the region, such as Pakistan, which has had a fundamental interference in its neighbor to the north, since the years of the anti-Soviet war, fearful of possible interference in Kabul of India, could pressure or extort the Taliban with very sensitive information that they have from their leaders , or directly finance the fractious Taliban at the controls, or play with Daesh or al-Qaeda, which could eventually join, as they just did last week in West Africa, so that peace is not possible, as always, in Afghanistan.

Image Source:

<https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2020/02/29/eeuu-y-los-talibanes-firmaron-un-historico-peace-agreement-in-doha/>

ARC "20 de Julio", the Antarctic explorer of the Colombian Navy

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



OPV-80 type patrol boat, ARC "20 de Julio" of the Colombian National Navy, in Antarctica.

The ARC "20 de Julio" at the time was the most complex and largest ship ever built in Colombia. It was incorporated into the National Navy as a proud example of the level of technological development that the country's naval industry had reached. It was built in COTECMAR with the highest standards of quality, safety, operational flexibility, and unassisted machinery concepts. From there, Colombia entered the small group of countries with the capacity to manufacture their own maritime vessels.

In the history of the National Navy, there have been 3 ships that have carried the name of ARC "July 20", this last one is the only one of the 3 that was built in Colombia, and it is the only one that has traveled to Antarctica. This OPV-80 was given the name of ARC "July 20" in order to join the commemoration of the Bicentennial of the Cry of Independence held in 2010 with multiple events nationwide.

The project for the construction of the OPV ARC "20 de Julio" with hull number 46, began in March 2009, generating 1,000 direct and 1,500 indirect jobs. The general objective is to have 6 of these vessels at the end of a 20-year period. The cost of the ARC "July 20" amounted to 133 billion Colombian pesos.

From the beginning it was assigned to the Pacific, contributing to security in the Colombian seas and rivers, weakening with its operations the logistical and

financial structures of the illegal armed groups that commit crimes in the Colombian Pacific, but at the same time safeguarding life in the sea.

The Platform is an original Fassmer design, but was modified in Colombia by Cotecmar, to adapt it to the needs of the Colombian National Navy. It is a ship that combines the trinomial composed of the command and control platform (the ship), a helicopter, and a high-speed interceptor ship. Being a very versatile unit, it can carry out operations of sovereignty, search and rescue, protection of natural resources, humanitarian aid and disaster relief. When it was designed, it was not thought that it could also become an Antarctic exploration ship.

On March 1, 2017 at 5 in the afternoon and after 75 days of navigation, the 96 crew members of the ARC ship "July 20" who were part of the III Colombian Scientific Expedition to Antarctica, which It was baptized "Almirante Padilla" in honor of the naval hero of the Colombian War of Independence. This Expedition was carried out within the framework of *the Colombian Antarctic Program*. After 14,000 miles sailed, the crew developed capabilities and procedures for navigation in Patagonian channels, Antarctic waters and in the presence of floating ice. In other words, this crew was trained to operate in the extreme conditions of the south of the planet.

In fact, that was the second trip of the ARC "July 20" to Antarctica. The lessons learned by the crew of this Colombian-made OPV-80 model vessel are being applied to improve its safe operating conditions. Although the OPV-80 was developed for security and sovereignty operations in tropical regions, with these expeditions to Antarctica it is further demonstrating its versatility, since it is not only operating in polar waters, but is also carrying out scientific tasks.

Under these conditions, the Ship-Boat-Helicopter trinomial, instead of chasing criminals who sail at full speed with their illegal cargo, is dedicated to transporting scientists along with their instruments and samples, making photographic records and bathymetric soundings.

In these extreme conditions, the crew has developed capabilities that were previously not available in the Colombian National Navy. It is not easy to fly in the climate and temperature conditions present in that area, nor to do it from a mobile platform such as a ship at sea. Another challenge was, for example, diving in frozen water, but that challenge was overcome thanks to the professionalism of the crew of this ship.

The naval aviation element, made up of a pilot, copilot, three technicians and a maintenance inspector, among other things, became the first Colombian crew to fly with night vision goggles over Antarctica.

The crew of the *Defender* -type covered boat also trained in these difficult conditions, and maintained high levels of operability. The boat was modified. Where before it carried an armament, the transducer of a multibeam echo sounder was placed. With this instrument it was possible to map 100% of the bottom

of two important bays, which could suffer alterations due to the increase in tourism arriving in the area on board ships. These readings were incorporated into the Antarctic scenario used in the CIDIAM simulator.

At the stern of the ARC "20 de Julio" a special container with equipment and systems was installed, which allowed the OPV-80 to operate as an oceanographic vessel. Special winches were installed that make it easier to lower equipment to a depth of 2,000 meters and, through these sensors, learn how the masses of water, the currents, the nutrients present in the water, the animals, among other variables of these extreme habitats, behave.

The Colombian Antarctic Program intends to carry out annual scientific expeditions to Antarctica, and to establish a permanent scientific base, which should be kept supplied, in addition to carrying out cyclical personnel changes. All this focused on the future claim of rights within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty. In this purpose, the OPV-80 ARC "July 20" is providing an invaluable service. At COTECMAR they are beginning to visualize the design and manufacture of a specific vessel for these missions.

In the austral summer 2018-2019, the 5th Colombian scientific expedition to Antarctica was carried out, this expedition was called "Almirante Campos", and it was also transferred aboard the ARC "20 de Julio", this time with 98 people between crew and scientists. The following were installed on the ship: a mobile oceanographic laboratory (LOMA), a mobile oceanographic platform (PMO) of the General Maritime Directorate; a Defender-type coast guard boat, two Zodiac-type boats and a Bell 412 helicopter.

Image Source:
Colombian National Navy

Douglas Hernandez

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Fuerzas Antiterroristas del Mundo

Andantes Fortuna Iuvat



Morocco

Groupe d'Intervention de La Gendarmerie Royale

The Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie is a force created to guarantee public security and public order and the implementation of the laws. It is the Royal Moroccan Army, and a military force is constituted in its structure, administration and forms of command. It is made up of officers and non-commissioned officers.



The duties of the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie are numerous and varied. However, the legislative body has attached great importance to police duties. The seventh article of the founding text indicates that "the objective of the gendarmerie service is to directly guarantee administrative, judicial and military police activities, especially, and to help the competent authorities with the application of the laws."

The foregoing implies three concurrent functions in terms of the use of the Royal Gendarmerie: support the National Defense Administration, especially in matters of organizational equipment and military judicial surveillance; To the Ministry of Justice for the implementation of judicial surveillance; and, to the Ministry of the Interior on the issue of the Common Administration Policy.

The duties of the Royal Gendarmerie, in this field, have been determined by the Criminal Trial Procedures code of 1959. It performs all these duties under the administration of the Royal Prosecutor and the control of the Court of Appeal. The duties consist of determining the crime before the prosecution gathers the evidence, detects the perpetrators and presents them before the authorized courts; and execute the judges' orders after the trial.

The staff of the Royal Gendarmerie participates in the implementation of the Judicial Police. The Royal Gendarmerie acting with the characteristics of being a judicially oriented police officer according to the Court of Criminal Procedure. Detects and determines the violation of laws as judicial police; and as a police officer of the public force, he informs the royal prosecutor of crimes and misdemeanors over which they have no jurisdiction.

To combat the continuous increase in crime and its international aspects, and also the increase in the complexity of crimes, the Royal Gendarmerie is continuously upgrading its methods and equipment and

strengthening its efficiency by evaluating technical and scientific surveillance and criminal data. For this purpose, two laboratories were established, which are under the management of high-level researchers.



There are two important police families within the Royal Gendarmerie that share specific preventive activities. They are the *General Administrative Police* and the *Special Administrative Police*. The first includes the general and individual measures related to the maintenance of public order, public security, health, peace and morals. This police is attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The other consists of a series of special police functions depending on the sector with which it must operate. These units, such as Traffic, Hunting, Fishing, Explosives, are organized according to special laws and attached to units of different ministries. According to regulatory texts, traffic surveillance and road safety represent one of its fundamental functions.

The Royal Gendarmerie gives priority to preventive measures when accompanying the activities of the Government. This is why it reinforces the administrative police with a unit that is securing and discouraging as extensively and continuously as possible.

The legal text that founded the Gendarmerie proposes that it be active throughout the country and appear in the army as a special unit. The gendarmerie is responsible for securing village roads and transportation. However, their activities generally take place outside the outskirts of the city. The Royal Gendarmerie are sometimes activated in cities when the situation calls for it.

The Gendarmerie is responsible for guarding the coasts and borders of the entire country (approximately 3,400 km); Most of the roads and highways and important points of social life.

The Groupe d'Intervention de La Gendarmerie Royale (مجموعة التدخل للدرك الملكي) is a Group attached to the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie and is made up of highly trained combatants to carry out special operations.

The GIGR is made up of the following units:

- 1 Motorized/Mechanized Battle Group
- 2 Parachute Infantry Brigades.
- 7 Command Units.
- 2 Airborne Assault Battalions.

1 Mountain Infantry Battalion.
1 Group of Guards (Commandos)
1 Light Security Brigade (LBS)

Marine infantry

- 3 Marine Battalions (Al Hoceima/Dakhla/Laayoun)
- 1 Marine Squadron (Casablanca)
- 16 Light Rapid Response Battalions.
- Royal Navy Intervention Groups.





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