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EDITORIAL

We begin this edition of TRIARIUS by effusively thanking Guadi Calvo, our senior analyst, for his constant and valuable contributions to this community. Precisely, the first text is his analysis of the situation in the Ivory Coast, in relation to the terrorist phenomenon.

Then, from Venezuela, Lieutenant Colonel (R/A) Pablo Escalante tells us about the presence of elements of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade of the US Army (SFAB) in Colombia, and how this constitutes a threat to the security of your country.

We immediately move on to Somalia, where Guadi explains in detail the complex geopolitical situation that converges in Somalia, where conflicting interests of other governments contribute to the devastation and instability that currently affect that country.

The following contribution is from Ulises León Kandiko . He enlightens us on the challenges of working from home, when his job involves national defence, in particular, showing us a perspective from United States Department of Defense.

We turn to Mauritania, a country that remains a haven free of terrorism, in an area strongly affected by this phenomenon. Guadi Calvo explains some possible reasons for this strange situation.

In his first contribution to TRIAIRUS, Mr. Daniel Franco presents a reflection on some unfortunate events that have recently occurred in Colombia, and that tremendously affect the image of the Armed Forces of this country.

We end this installment with a review of the OPV-80 type ships in service with the Chilean and Colombian navies. These patrol boats have been very useful in fighting all kinds of crimes at sea.

Know to win!

Douglas Hernández

Editor



This newsletter has a Spanish version.

TRIARIUS 074

Content:

Ivory Coast, a country targeted by terrorism, p.4

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Operation of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade of the US Army (SFAB) on a mission within SOUTHCOM in Colombia, p.6

By Pablo Escalante, Lieutenant Colonel (R/A) (Venezuela)

Death lives on in Somalia, p.9

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

The home office and national defense, p.12

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)

Mauritania, free from the mujahideen scourge, p.14

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Bad apples or structural problems? Some considerations on acts of violation of Human Rights by the Colombian Military Forces, p.17

By: Daniel Franco (Colombia)

Naval Patrol Boats OPV-80, p.20

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



TRIARIUS

When the quarantine came as a result of the scourge of the pandemic, most went into shock. Multiple concerns came to our minds, and many of them had to do with the most basic: there is not enough food in the refrigerator, the treatment medicines will run out soon, we do not have masks or alcohol, there are no candles or matches, I can not go out to buy and if I could I don't have enough money, I can't go to the cashier, how can I help and protect my mother if she doesn't live with me? What happens if the water and electricity go out? a mob of looters how will I defend my family and property what do I do if we have a medical emergency will the country collapse will this be the end of civilization should I believe what they tell me on TV ?, how do I get more food?, should we move to the field?. It would be pertinent to sit down as a family and do a retrospective analysis of everything that happened and is happening, and brainstorm ideas to solve each thing in the face of the next crisis.

On the cover, **Tanzanian Soldier**.
See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue free of charge.

Ivory Coast, a country targeted by terrorism

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Press image recalling the attack on the Grand- Bassam hotel complex in the Ivory Coast.

Last Thursday the eleventh, at night, a mixed army and gendarmerie post was attacked in Kafolo, in the northeast, a fairly isolated region of the Ivory Coast, near the border with Burkina Faso. At least eleven soldiers and a gendarme were killed in the attack, while another six were injured, while another two are missing, while the attackers, according to some witnesses, had dispersed in the woods. Without the participation of Ghana, which shares a large area of that wilderness, locating the terrorists would be virtually impossible.

Some residents of the area, contacted by telephone by local journalists, reported that an exchange of shots had been heard since the morning, so it is believed that the attackers were escaping from the men of Operation Comoe, a military force made up of men from the army of Burkina Faso and the defense and security forces of the Ivory Coast (SDS), launched in mid-May last and whose name was taken from the river that separates both nations.

Its mission is focused on counteracting the presence of the Wahhabi khatibas (brigades) installed in that area since last year. The military command has not given information about the number of troops that make up the joint force, although it is believed that it is very small and will be quickly surpassed by the mujahideen trained in years of war on the different fronts that fundamentalist terrorism has opened in different places in Africa.

Since its launch in mid-May, the binational force has managed to dismantle the Alidouougou terrorist camp, in the Burkina Faso province of Comoe, where the Khatiba operated. Macina, (Brigade for the Liberation of Macina) in which eight militiamen died and another 38 were taken prisoner. It was also known that SDS had clashes with men from the Khatiba in the villages of Tinadalla and Diambeh, (Ivory Coast) where, according to the locals themselves, the fighters had settled there for more than a month mixing with the locals, and who often crossed into Burkina Faso, without any inconvenience, heading for the Alidouougou base.

the khatiba Macina, founded in 2015, by the legendary preacher, Amadou Koufa, declared dead on several occasions, although he is still in command of his group and is one of the highest ranking emirs of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims or GSIM) a conglomerate of terrorist organizations operating in the Sahel, which came together under the leadership of al-Qaeda in 2017. Last week it became known that one of the most important leaders of GSIM, Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel (See: The death of the emir), was killed in northern Mali, in an action by the men of Operation Barkhane, the French troops stationed in northern Mali since 2014, to contain terrorist actions.

The residents of the area where the attack took place last Thursday, the vast majority of small cotton and peanut producers, have been ordered by the regular forces to remain in their homes, until further notice, with the impossibility of reaching to their plantations, while the continuity of the fighting continued to be heard.

Although no organization has claimed responsibility for the latest attack, there are no presumptions about who is responsible, since in these sectors since 2015, different terrorist organizations that respond to both al-Qaeda and Daesh, coming from Mali, they settled in the north of Burkina Faso, turning that region into a large field of operations, where they have already caused more than a thousand deaths and a million displaced persons, in addition to the paralysis of a large number of productive activities and where they have Hundreds of schools must be closed, since they are the essential objective of terrorists, along with Christian temples. They have murdered dozens of teachers and attacked churches in full activity, forcing not only the closure of school and religious buildings but also the departure of thousands of teachers, priests and pastors. In 2019 alone, Takfirist violence caused 4,000 deaths in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

For all these reasons, the authorities in Yamoussoukro, the Ivorian capital, have gone on high alert since the 550-kilometre border between these two countries, as is the case with almost all African borders, is absolutely permeable, even some combatants had been detected last year north of the Comoe National Park some 300 kilometers northwest of the Ivorian capital.

Reasons to fear

The attack last Thursday, although it could be considered minor given the number of casualties, compared to the actions of other terrorist organizations operating in West Africa, only this last weekend in the state of Borno, in the north of Nigeria, the group Boko Haram caused almost ninety deaths in two attacks, although the list could be as tragic as it is extensive, as it began to happen in the north of Burkina Faso from 2015 or in the north of Mozambique in 2017, the attacks begin to happen almost imperceptibly, isolated events that can even be confused with a gang of common criminals, until it explodes like a gale destroying everything that stands in its way.

In Ivory Coast, with a total population of almost 26 million inhabitants, the religious communities have remained balanced with almost 10 million Muslims, just over eight million Christians, while the rest are fundamentally animist cults. These percentages do not make a fundamentalist government possible, which is what the Wahhabi movements aspire to, which already operate with constant violence in other countries in the region such as Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, with Muslim populations much larger. important, although their fanaticism could make them resort to any practice, if

they had the slightest chance, which includes persecution, expulsion and extermination, such as what Saudi Arabia has been carrying out in Yemen for five years, in full view of of all the world.

takfirist terrorism attack in the country, when the Grand- Bassam hotel complex was taken over, near Abidjan, the economic capital of the country, which resulted in around twenty dead and on that occasion his authorship was claimed by the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), today also a member of the GSIM, whose leader was Abdelmalek Droukdel recently removed.

According to some intelligence reports, the emir of the GSIM group, Amadou Koufa sent one of his closest lieutenants to the triple border of Burkina, Ivory Coast and Mali, to start a recruitment campaign in view of more actions like those of Kafolo. Having chosen a military post, he undoubtedly clearly indicates that those who executed him and were able to escape unscathed are in technical and tactical conditions to repeat it, even more so when the country begins a race for the presidential elections that will be held in October and the recent resignation of his The candidacy of the current president, Alassane Ouattara, adds an even greater seasoning of instability to a country that is in the crosshairs of Wahhabi terrorism.

Image Source:

<https://static1.abc.es/media/internacional/2016/03/14/policia-cordon-policial-costa-ivoril--620x349.jpg>

Guadi Calvo

(Argentina) Argentine writer and journalist. International Analyst specialized in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.

Operation of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade of the US Army (SFAB) in mission within SOUTHCOM in Colombia

By Pablo Escalante, Lieutenant Colonel (R/A) (Venezuela)



On Monday, June 1, 46 US soldiers belonging to the First Security Force and Assistance Brigade (SFAB), attached to the Southern Command of the United States Armed Forces, arrived in Colombia. In a statement issued by the United States Embassy in Colombia, the arrival of one of the advisory teams belonging to the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade of the US Army (SFAB) to Colombia is announced, supporting the fight that the country is carrying out against drug trafficking. The SFAB is a specialized unit of the United States Army formed to train, advise, assist, enable, and accompany operations with allied and partner nations.

According to the information portal of the North American Army, Army Times, the deployment of the SFAB Brigades in Central and South America is part of the "effort

of the administration of President Trump to strengthen anti-narcotics operations in the Caribbean, after the imputation of charges for drug trafficking to the president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, by the Government of the United States".

The personnel assigned to this mission, who will arrive in the country in an approximate number of 50 members, will focus their efforts on the areas implemented within the comprehensive strategy of the so-called *Future Zones* delimited by the national government: "Pacífico Nariñense, Catatumbo, Bajo Cauca and south of Córdoba, Arauca, and Chiribiquete and surrounding National Natural Parks". The new mission is part of President Donald Trump's enhanced counternarcotics strategy for South and Central America announced last month, which has increased focus on

counterdrug smuggling operations, carried out largely by Navy ships and the Coast Guard in the region, the US Southern Command said in a statement. This mission will mark a new chapter for the 1st SFAB Brigade, which since its activation in February 2018 has served a deployment to Afghanistan and sent smaller advisory units to train in Europe and work with militaries in Africa. The deployment to South America will mark the first operation for Army SFABs within SOUTHCOM, specifically in Colombia.

The arrival of this elite force that has set off the alarms in Colombian society, up to fight against drugs, this has raised suspicions, especially due to the recent events that have occurred in Venezuela, and the threat from the Donald Trump government, when the month In the past year, he

announced "Enhanced Operations to Fight Narcotics" and in which the Venezuelan government was openly threatened, accusing it of taking advantage of drug trafficking, when it is proven by international organizations that Venezuela does not cultivate, produce, or traffic drugs, and is widely known as the Bolivarian Armed Forces - through its air defense - constantly interdicts aircraft that use Venezuelan airspace to take drugs to other countries, a large number of them being unusable, as well as the seizure of large quantities of drugs, and the capture and extradition of capos requested by the DEA.

It was the US government that made the announcement and not President Iván Duque or, failing that, his Defense Minister. Several congressmen protested, the senator from the La U party, Armando Benedetti, assured that the first thing is that the arrival of troops from that country must be endorsed by the Congress of our country. For his part, Senator Jorge Robledo asserted that in any country, a defense minister who was not aware that a plan of such magnitude was being planned in his country would be removed from office, implying that the chief of the portfolio Carlos Holmes Trujillo should leave the position, since he never knew about it. "If a war breaks out in Venezuela, the risk of Colombia catching fire is total. They are playing with fire against a power that they do not control, they are playing with the lives of Colombians," he concluded.

According to Brigadier General Scott Jackson, commander of the SFAB 1st Brigade, this group would come to the country "to help develop security capabilities that allow them to apply persistent pressure on criminal organizations and provide security to their nation while helping us to counter threats to the United States." Lt. Col. Kevin Field, the SFAB Recruiting Team Leader, said during a Facebook Live broadcast, "SFAB's mission is a refocused training, assisting and advising strategy that deploys specialized units to critical points around the world. the world".

As of 2018, with the incorporation of Colombia into NATO as a global partner, the presence of the various US security and defense institutions and private military contractors (CMP) in Colombia becomes even more legitimate. Therefore, the arrival of this new contingent of US troops becomes relevant because it occurs within the framework of the previously described context that threatens the security of the Bolivarian Revolution and that is intended to incite the first fratricidal war of the 21st century in *Our America* by propitiate an attack on Venezuela from Colombia, but it is not unusual, nor is it in itself a novelty.

The Joint Task Forces, as defined by Professor Renán Vega Cantor (Vega, 2016) "are rapid deployment groups with a diversity of specializations. These groups are characterized by their ability to adapt in various fields and their flexibility in the type of actions, in

addition to their largely confidential nature. In several of them there is a presence of US Pentagon Brigade Commanders with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan." The Vulcano Joint Task Force, to which, according to the Colombian Minister of Defense, part of this foreign troop is directed, is located in Tibú, Catatumbo, Norte de Santander department. (Border with the State of Zulia) Whose initial strength is between 7,900 and 10,000 troops. These were reinforced in 2018 with around 5,000 troops from the Rapid Deployment Force No. 3 (Fudra). This is the only Brigade that, according to Carlos Holmes, would come to advise this US contingent on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

Various journalistic sources point to a lack of consensus in the Colombian Forces in relation to Venezuela and the role that the Colombian government is forcing them to play. There are even analyzes that point to the internal fracture of the Armed Forces. as the reason for sending this American mission as an action to retake control over them. What is public and notorious is that in recent months several corruption scandals have been uncovered in the Colombian high command, which have even led to direct complaints by representatives of the Colombian Congress before representatives of the US Senate and NATO, requesting that the funds that that country and that organization allocate to the Colombian state for military purposes be reviewed.

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Image Source:

[https://dir.md/wiki/Security_Force_Assistance_Brigade_\(SFAB\)?host=wikipedia.org](https://dir.md/wiki/Security_Force_Assistance_Brigade_(SFAB)?host=wikipedia.org)

Paul Escalante

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Death lives on in Somalia

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Images of the terrorist attack that occurred in 2017, which left more than 300 dead.

Since Donald Trump became president of the United States, among many other things that he did not do or has done wrong, is his policy regarding Somalia, which is limited to bombing different areas of the African country without much order, against "possible" terrorist bases, which has caused, on more than one occasion, the tragic "collateral damage", which despite the presence of an important CIA force in Mogadishu and the north of the country, have not been able to locate the real bases of the terrorists, for what air strikes continue to be Russian roulette in which all 15 million Somalis participate.

Last week Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounced that at least seven people had died as a result of these aerial operations since the beginning of the year. Last February 2nd in Jilib , a small agricultural village in the south of the country, after a drone attack, a young woman died and several people were injured. According to

investigators, no signs of terrorist activity were found in that area. On March 10, another air raid near Janaale , about 95 kilometers from Mogadishu, targeted a minibus, killing six civilians, including a child. While the relatives of the dead deny that they were terrorists, the command of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) insisted that they belonged to al-Shabaab , closing the discussion.

Trump's contempt for the country in the Horn of Africa was signed yesterday when in Tulsa, Oklahoma, at a rally for his reelection, harassing Democratic congressman of Somali origin Ilhan Omar, said that his country of origin was: "an anarchic state and illegal" and wondered if Ilhan "wanted the United States to degenerate to those levels." As if the United States had done nothing so that Somalia has become the epitome of the "Failed State".

The African country continues to be ignored by the major international press and they only

focus on it when the terrorist actions are spectacular and the dead are too many to hide among so many inconsequential news in which the dominant West wastes ink, hours and bits of its information.

Beyond the lack of information, al-Shabaab , the terrorist group linked to global al-Qaeda, continues its fight in an irreducible way, hitting more spaced out, but with the same effectiveness as always.

On the night of Saturday June 20, an explosive attack has left at least a dozen dead and more than twenty injured. The incident occurred in the city of Wanlaweyn , about ninety kilometers from Mogadishu , the country's capital, in the Lower Shabelle region , where two explosives, with the explosion of the first about nine people died, and several more were injured. According to witnesses, after that explosion, when guards and neighbors came to help the victims, there was a second explosion, killing several more people and causing more injuries. This tactic is

frequently used by these groups, applied on many occasions in Nigeria and Afghanistan. The most complex wounded had to be referred, they were transferred to a nearby base of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) installed in the country since 2007 with the aim of stopping the actions of the mujahideen.

Baadweyn military base, in the Mudug region of central Somalia, which houses the 21st division of the Somali National Army (ENS) when the military managed to prevent the entry of a car bomb driven by a shahid (martyr), launching a rocket at him that blew him up, at one of the entrances to the military establishment. After the initial explosion, several militiamen opened fire on the regular troops, starting a fight that would have lasted several hours. According to the version of the high command, there were no casualties among its personnel, although other sources indicate that several soldiers had been killed. That the confrontation has lasted several hours, conspires against the official version, which always tends to hide or reduce the number of casualties, while al-Shabaab, who claimed responsibility for the attack, reported that two or three soldiers had died and others four were injured, coinciding with what was provided by witnesses to the attack. The profile of the operation matches the one used on many occasions by al-Shabaab, used against other military bases, public buildings and hotels, where after hitting with a major detonation, militiamen open fire on the surveillance trying to enter the attacked target.

It was also learned that heavy fighting had occurred between an al-Shabaab khatiba (brigade) and the pro-government vigilante group Ma'awisley, (in maay-maay, one of the most widely spoken languages in Somalia, it could be translated as

"irregular") after terrorists attacked the villages of Yaqbariweyne and Kaba-hirig near Baledogle airfield in Lower Shabelle. The Ma'awisley are a paramilitary force, made up fundamentally of young people from different villages in the Somali interior, whose function is to protect these communities and prevent them from being taken over and co-opted by fundamentalists, who also use these populations as quarries. For new additions to their ranks, the number of victims of these confrontations could not be known.

While this was happening, men from the Somali army were protesting in Mogadishu, cutting off an access route, due to the arrears in their salaries, which in some cases last a year. It is common for commanders to appropriate remittances from active soldiers, while they hide casualties and desertions to continue receiving those salaries.

The advantage of having rich friends

The fundamentalist group al-Shabaab, since 2004, has been the most important player in Somali reality. The fundamentalists came to control much of the country, including Mogadishu until, in 2011, when, thanks to the intervention of AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, which, with some 9,000 men from Uganda and Burundi, managed to expel the terrorists from the capital, although since then they have continued to operate and generate serious attacks that have left hundreds dead in its streets, such as the one in October 2017, which left at least 500 dead.

In any case, the group has remained very active not only taking over towns and small cities in the interior of the country or carrying out major attacks in the capital, but also attacking targets in Kenya on

different occasions, including in its capital Nairobi in 2013, 2017, and at the University of Garissa in 2015 and produced a total of victims that exceeds 300 dead civilians and one hundred more wounded.

To remain in a state of war with displacement and truly surprising actions during all these years, it has had to have an extremely agile and prodigal financial support.

Last May, within the framework of the "war" of declarations between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) regarding their interests in Africa and particularly in Libya, where Ankara supports the Tripoli government while the UAE supports the side of the General Khalifa Haftar, in a statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry slips that (the support of) "the United Arab Emirates to terrorist groups is not a secret". The document says that a terrorist group operates in Somalia. And he expands quite naturally: "The actions of the UAE to disrupt peace, security and stability not only in Libya, but also in Yemen, Syria and the entire region, including the Horn of Africa, are a natural matter. It is also little secret that the UAE government provides support to terrorist organizations, particularly al-Shabaab and Yemeni separatist groups. The Ankara document ends by advising the UAE government to refrain from the hostile attitude towards Turkey and acknowledge its role.

Beyond Turkey's statements that the Emirates are supporting al-Shabaab, there is no evidence, although the background of the Gulf monarchies, mainly Saudi Arabia, the US and Qatar, have invested billions of dollars in internal terrorism. - tional and not only with respect to "Islamic" groups, but also known to have collaborated with the Nicaraguan contras and the Italian fascists of Ordine Nuovo in the 1980s. Reaching his maximum contributions in the anti-Soviet war

in Afghanistan and in the invasion of Syria in 2010, in which he financed thousands of mercenaries who came to plunge the Syrian people into hell from which they have not yet emerged.

The Wahhabi monarchies have collaborated with the instability policies applied by the United States, in different regions, and are responsible for spreading terrorism in the phase that began with the

"Arab Spring" in 2011, from Nigeria to the Philippines, for which Somalia, it is just one more link in that tragic chain.

Image Source:

<https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-orient/cifra-de-muertos-en-atentado-en-somalia-141824>



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The home office and national defense

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)



Headquarters of the Department of Defense of the United States of America

Some time ago I shared with you some insights on what lessons are we learning in times of Covid-19? And how do we adapt to the new scenario? Within this, I tangentially touched on the subject of the Home Office in the field of the United States Air Force and the internal problems they were experiencing. With all this in mind, a first conclusion, not at all risky, is that the COVID-19 Pandemic has had a drastic impact on all levels of operations within the various areas of Government, both in those central and highly technical countries and in those that they are not.

This situation, without a doubt, makes it difficult to imagine a quick return to the old way of doing things. The most recent evidence is found in the comments of Secretary of Defense Mark Esper (Department of Defense - DoD - of the United States of America) in a virtual event of the Brookings Institution on May 4: "There will be a new normal to the that we will have to adapt for an extended period of time, at least until we have a vaccine that we are confident of achieving."

Esper also noted that he was "pleasantly surprised" by the level of productivity Pentagon employees achieved while working remotely in

less than ideal conditions. Balancing productivity with the need to defend National Security over a period of months, if not years, presents both a challenge and an opportunity as DoD personnel turn to commercially available Home Office tools.

When thinking about the tools DoD would need to navigate this radically changing environment, they realized they must address the fact that high-impact DoD data will now need to be stored in a variety of locations throughout the facility, as well as as in remote environments. This led to the conclusion that the DoD will likely have to start building local private clouds and more significantly increase its integration and use of multiple public clouds. To do this you will need to address certain key challenges, each with National Security implications.

Manage rapid transformation

Dana Deasy, who is the CIO of the DoD, heads the DoD task force teleworking Readiness of CIOs and senior IT officials to address the challenges introduced by a "Maximum Home Office" policy. The bottom line is that executing this important transition in such a short time has never been done in

Federal Agencies to this degree. The DoD must manage this migration while preserving business continuity and not compromising the highest levels of Homeland Security as the attack surface extends to less controllable, individually acquired devices and data.

Ensuring data mobility

Deasy said that some of the data being created was living in an unclassified environment, and that the agency is "looking at options for how we take this data and retain it and/or transfer it to other collaborative environments in the future".

Data mobility also requires cloud mobility: Agencies must be able to transparently and securely move data between environments. Data must be portable, easy to manage, and flow between all endpoints so agencies can avoid vendor lock-in. Seamless mobility goes hand in hand with the flexibility that OMB envisions Cloud Smart enabling when it comes to moving data and applications.

Reduced data complexity

Commercial providers perpetually innovate to simplify the

user experience. The technology isn't simple, of course, but providing ways to make it as simple as possible should be a goal for any vendor. Deploying a collaboration tool, public cloud service, or communications platform on its own is manageable, but the challenge comes when organizations start working with too many of them.

As the DoD brings more of these pieces into its networks, then naturally the complexity increases, so the DoD must insist on simplicity in its multi-vendor, multi-cloud environment. In addition, significantly expanded access to and use of the secret network of Secret Internet Protocol Routers (SIPRNet) in a remote or telecommuting environment may be required to exchange information so that personnel with a need to know can receive and generate information from critical mission.

In this context, the DoD must also consider how quickly and efficiently data can be copied and backed up, how quickly it can be retrieved, and how this can be done consistently across both local and multiple data clouds. But protection will also mean encryption and ensure that data is safe, regardless of where it lives. The final piece of this puzzle includes Access and Compliance; who is accessing the data, from where, who is moving it, and if they did, we are now exposed to any type of security or compliance breach.

It's a long way to Tipperary

DoD 's telecommuting capacity is pushing data management to the limit. Overcoming those challenges requires integrated and holistic data management capabilities.

Let's start at the Infrastructure as a Service layer. Predominantly the requirements DoD needs to focus on here are how to reduce costs or reduce risk, but there is much more to this layer as well. As they consider their infrastructure, organizations must also think about what performance and density they can achieve, what level of protection is available within each storage endpoint, does it connect to the cloud (so they can consider data tiers, for example), do they need capabilities for compliance? Can they get these capabilities on cloud and on-premises storage endpoints?

There is no single product that can do all of these things together, so organizations need to have multiple solutions that allow them to choose the one that meets the combination of features they need. Organizations are likely to need more than one solution to address all of their requirements and therefore need to be built without silos. That requires the establishment of a data structure, strategy.

A data fabric enables organizations to fully discover, integrate, automate, optimize, protect, and secure data,

applications, and resources across all the protocols that are most appropriate for their requirements. Uniquely built by each organization, a data fabric ensures that data and applications are in the right place, at the right time, with the right features and capabilities to drive innovation.

Next comes the Platform as a Service layer, where organizations must consider how they can introduce data services that allow them to continue to reduce operational risk while increasing agility. There are a number of key capabilities to consider at this layer, including discovery, integration, automation, and protection.

Ultimately, the real value of all these data management capabilities comes at the Software as a Service layer, where IT teams using your data fabric can accelerate results and increase agility for application owners and developers. .

COVID -19 has imposed a transformation in the way organizations manage and run their IT infrastructure to maintain productivity and National Defense. That evolution will take place much faster than expected, catalyzed by unforeseen work-from-home mandates. An overall strategy will be required to prepare the system as a whole for the future, and an integrated data structure approach is perceived as the appropriate strategy.

Image Source:


<https://api.time.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/pentagon.jpg>

Ulysses Leon Kandiko

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Mauritania freed from the Mujahideen scourge

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



The African Sahel, there you can see to the west, the geographical location of Mauritania.

The Sahel war, which began with the Tuareg revolt in 2012, confined to the north of Mali, was catalyzed by the disappearance of Colonel Mohamad Gaddafi, who served as a natural barrier to Wahhabi terrorism, and the overthrow of Mali's president, Amadou Touré, in March 2012, who is believed to have had a secret non-aggression agreement with al-Qaeda.

Today in West Africa, terrorism disputes inch by inch, with the local armies and the different units belonging to the armies of the United States, France and some other nations of the European Union, that extensive region that extends over seven nations. And beyond the huge material

investments and in lives they have not been able to reduce the lethality of these organizations. Quite the contrary, since 2012, when they began to operate masked behind the protest revolt of the Tuareg people, the different khatibas, today adherents of Daesh or al-Qaeda, continue to expand with increasing force in that region.

Sectors of the north and center of Mali, the northeast of Burkina Faso, the west of Niger, the southwest of Chad, while they have also begun to filter mujahideen in Côte d'Ivoire and how to complete the terrorist spectrum of West Africa, it would be necessary to add to boko Haram, which from northern Nigeria has hit the Lake Chad region and Cameroon with

increasing frequency. This situation during 2019 has produced almost three thousand deaths in the entire region.

It will be very complex to prevent terrorism from continuing to develop, without cutting off the network of financiers that supports it. This extensive network that flows permanently to these groups ranges from the Gulf monarchies to the South American drug cartels, who pay protection to move their shipments from the Gulf of Guinea to the Mediterranean by land and from there to Europe. In addition, these groups obtain income from their own "ventures" smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, among other activities.

Faced with this picture of the situation, while the countries of the region are struggling desperately in the face of unstoppable terrorist actions, Mauritania seems to be an island, resistant to the problems in which its neighbors are sinking. Of a size similar to that of Venezuela, with a population that does not reach five million inhabitants, of which practically all of them, more than 98 percent, are Muslims, it remains unscathed in the face of terror, despite sharing a border of 2,250 kilometers, with the hottest sectors of the war in Mali, and having the history of having been the first country in the Sahel to suffer a terrorist attack and having suffered it for a long five years.

In July 2005, Abdelmalek Droukdel, in command of a 300-man khatiba, from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) would arrive from Algeria to attack the Mauritanian army barracks in Lemgheity, where they killed about twenty soldiers, in revenge for the arrest of several of his "brothers" detained in Nouakchott, the Mauritanian capital. During the following five years, Mauritania would suffer a series of terrorist actions perpetrated by the GSPC, coming from Algeria and Mali, particularly in the kidnapping of tourists and aid workers from different NGOs.

GSPC Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel, who would be the brains of most of them, would trace an important trajectory in African terrorism, in 2017, he would form the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin or Support Front for Islam and Muslims (JNIM), the branch of al-Qaeda in the Sahel, was assassinated in northern Mali on June 3 by French troops from the Operation Barkhane. (See: Sahel: The death of the emir.)

Fight or bargain

Historically, Mauritania suffered from chronic instability, due to the usual causes of the young African nations, structural poverty, corruption, coups, exploitation of the old metropolises, to which is added to Mauritania in recent decades great droughts, which they

exhausted the already poor agricultural production of the country, even forcing many nomadic tribes to settle on the outskirts of large urban conglomerates, which increased unemployment rates; Added to these evils are the constant divisions in the armed forces, political conspiracies, and permanent tribal and racial tensions. Mauritania, in the midst of the almost geographical transition between the sub-Saharan black culture and the Islamic north, has not been able to mitigate the tense historical relations that the haratin (freed black slaves) have with their former masters and traffickers, the Arabs, taking into account that this The practice was only eliminated in 1981, although some 45,000 people are still in this condition (See: Mauritania, a slave state).

The country is among the poorest in the world, despite having important mining resources: deposits of gold, uranium, precious stones and oil, among others, in addition to its almost 750 kilometers of Atlantic coast, where one of the banks richest fishing in the world, exploited to the devastation by Spanish and Japanese companies.

To this state of affairs must be added the fanatical preaching of the many Wahhabi imams financed by the Saudis, who initiated thousands of young people into their strict Sharia law. Between 1989 and 2008, in Nouakchott alone, the number of mosques increased from 58 to 900. The fundamentalism preached in both mosques and madrassas was a propitious framework for the recruitment of hundreds who became part of the GSPC, who from In 2007 it was renamed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in which the Mauritanian militiamen became the largest group, after the Algerians. The disregard of the borders of the weak governments focused on internal struggles, provided the possibility for the takfirists to operate as they pleased within the large areas that lacked state control for more than five years. The most representative case of this anomie occurred in 2008, in the Tourine military camp, in the north of the

country, where a dozen Mauritanian soldiers were kidnapped and later had their throats cut by the rigorists, revealing the lack of preparation of the army, which already during the war in Western Sahara (1975-1978), the Polisario Front, had made evident, given that the army was always poorly paid, lacking in weapons and without training. Producing a very low combat morale.

In February 2008, there was also an alleged terrorist act against the Israeli embassy, which left only three bystanders injured, although it was never possible to clarify whether the event was an operation carried out by AQIM or a simple police episode. Mauritania was one of the few Arab League countries to establish diplomatic relations with Tel-Aviv, which opened its embassy in 1999, which "strangely" did not arouse much resentment among the most fanatical and produced an extraordinary approval at the White House.

The experience of the attack on the Tourine camp precipitated the same year, a coup that brought General Abdel Aziz to the presidency (2009 to 2019), who together with his defense minister Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the current president, would carry out a deep military reform, to the point of turning the armed forces into the fundamental objective of the "work" of government. The troops were revalued, with substantial improvements in their salaries, the military bases rebuilt, all the weapons renewed, and the troops received better training, including courses given by officers from France and the United States. In addition, the intelligence service was reorganized and reoriented, providing them with equipment, training, along with a large budget, for the creation of elite units such as the Grupo Nómada (GN).

With these investments, Mauritania has gained control of its borders and became a member of the Trans-Saharan Association Against Terrorism. In 2012, he also participated in NATO's Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP).

After the harsh experience of the second part of the 2000s, Mauritania, with a fully modernized army, joined the joint force known as the Sahel Group 5, together with Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, created in 2014, to combat terrorist actions, which intervenes alongside the French troops of Operation Barkha-ne and other Western forces.

Beyond all these military forecasts, to prevent terrorism from

including Mauritania in its roadmap, many analysts believe that there is a secret non-aggression pact between the Mauritanian authorities and the terrorists, similar to the one the former president had Mali Amadou Toure.

According to some documents found in the residence of Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad, Pakistan, after his "death" in 2011, the rapprochement between the Nouakchott authorities and the

founder of al-Qaeda would be confirmed. Another significant fact in this direction is that in 2015, when Daesh proclaimed the creation of the Wilāyat (province) of West Africa, it did not include Mauritania.

Until today, the country "strangely" remains free of the Mujahideen scourge, and it is unknown whether the guarantor of this miracle is Allah or the North American State Department.

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Bad apples or structural problems? Some considerations on acts of violation of Human Rights by the Colombian Military Forces

By: Daniel Franco (Colombia)



Soldiers of the Colombian National Army.

Every time situations such as those that have occurred recently are reported within institutions such as the Army or the Police, one of the "arguments" that comes to the fore is "not to generalize" and that is more or less summed up in the mantra that It has become a cliché: you cannot judge an entire institution of several hundred thousand by the behavior of a few. At least, this is what is argued by those who try to convince us that the problem is reduced by acting in isolation from a few "bad apples". Those who argue this way should be reminded, first of all, that generalizing is not the same as universalizing. Second, to deny generalization is practically to deny any process of thought and rationality: the way in which we human beings understand the world and which has largely meant the success of our species has been our ability to obtain deductions from some cases. To deny generalization is to deny the very task of science: how do we conclude that a medical treatment, say, will work when we

cannot apply it to 100% of individuals? Well, statistically, it is applied with a number that constitutes a representation of the entire universe (which are usually just a few hundred, perhaps thousands) and from the results, we deduce conclusions for millions.

In such a way that, faced with an unfortunate event such as the rape of the indigenous girl that occurred recently, it is hardly logical to ask: has the same event happened before in the past or could it happen again in the future? Could behavior like that of the soldiers who committed the rape be repeated in so many others? And then, precisely, we learned of another case, similar in certain conditions and circumstances, which occurred last year, which confirms that it is indeed something that can be repeated. And then, General Zapateiro himself, Commander of the Colombian Army, acknowledges that from 2016 to date (a fairly short period, in fact) there are at least 118 cases of rape of minors that are under study. Beware: we are only

talking about the cases where the victims are minors (and the adult victims?) And of course, about the cases in which there is hardly any knowledge, and that, in a negligent and cover-up State like the Colombian one, it is shallower.

It is not guaranteed, of course, that each one of the individuals that make up the institution behaves in this way (which is equivalent to universalizing) but we are facing a reiteration that in an obviously logical and understandable way leads us to think about what occurs in the Institution and if the practices and ideologies that it fosters and/or covers up this type of situation.

And if to the cases of sexual abuse, we add other situations of transgression of Human Rights, in which a macabre systematicity is also observed, it is logical that suspicions are raised regarding what happens in Institutions such as the Police and the Army.

Were the false positives actions undertaken by a few "bad apples" that tarnished the name of the Institution and that does not

represent the laudable actions of the majority of its members? Is the generalization unjustifiable in this particular situation?

The systematic nature and consistency in the way these heinous State crimes were carried out suggests that they were not. That these false positives followed the same logic and the same patterns in geographies and contexts as dissimilar as those of Ituango in Antioquia, or Soacha in Cundinamarca suggests that it is a complex structure articulated around these practices and not so much the occasional, random or sporadic actions of a few individuals. Did extrajudicial executions make - or make part - of

the military doctrine in Colombia? Has the collusion of the Military and Police Forces with all kinds of criminal structures, from neighborhood gangs to large-scale criminal organizations, become a national security strategy? This may be unlikely for those who consider that these facts correspond to the isolated action of some members of the institution, and that as such the responsibility lies only with those individuals. But for those of us who maintain, with all logical evidence, that all these facts have presented a persistence in time and space, it is a truth that we have to face as a society.

We will never reach a stage of true social welfare until - among

other things - and in accordance with our legal system, those who act as protectors of the community - I am talking about police and military - recognize that they gave themselves, as an Institution, to everything type of degradations and barbarism for the satisfaction of particular interests and common benefits within the institution. Only then, there, will a process of consolidation of some true FFMM defenders of human dignity begin, and their credibility in society will become an articulation with the processes of building the country. And perhaps, then, on the horizons of misery that border our fields and cities, the new Colombian reality will be woven.

Image Source:

<https://cdn.colombia.com/sdi/2020/06/25/condena-soldados-abuso-nina-indigena-risaralda-840656.jpg>

Daniel Franco

(Colombia) He studied a Bachelor of Humanities, Spanish Language. Currently, he works as a teacher and is studying for a Master's degree in Social Pedagogy. He has developed research processes in the Criminal Responsibility System for Adolescents, where his concern has revolved around promoting new visions of criminal justice and a transformation in punitive matters, both for adolescents and adults. Another of his personal and academic interests is in the understanding of the historical-social processes that have marked the construction of the Colombian nation.



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Naval Patrol Boats OPV-80

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



ARC "Victoria", Vessel type OPV-80 of the National Navy of Colombia.

The acronym OPV stands for *Offshore Patrol Vessel*, which translates Maritime Patrol Vessel. These are vessels designed for low- or medium-intensity military operations, in which they are not expected to engage in combat with larger adversary units, but instead perform very diverse functions other than combat as such. However, in times of war, these ships will support the war effort within the limits of their capabilities.

Compared to other warships they are relatively small. They are usually operated by the police or coastguard services, and exceptionally by the navy. Its characteristics allow it to be highly versatile, it can fulfill functions of presence and sovereignty in national maritime spaces, border protection, anti-piracy, the fight against drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal immigration. They can patrol against illegal fishing and can also participate in search and rescue operations. In some cases, they can be used for the evacuation

of people, humanitarian support, and even as a hospital ship. These diverse capabilities make owning them a good investment due to their excellent cost-benefit ratio.

Depending on the classification of ships made by the countries, the definition of an OPV may vary, in some cases missile launchers and torpedo boats are included in that category, due to their size, without taking into account their weapons. In our region, it is understood that an OPV does not have heavy weapons, and that its size is smaller than that of a Corvette. Within the navies, they are usually the smallest ships, but at the same time they are large and maneuverable enough to be able to patrol the high seas for a reasonable period of time.

It is clear that, in small navies, from so-called third world countries, an OPV could be perhaps the largest ship in their fleet.

Its origin dates back to the First World War, where the different participating countries required to put into service as many ships as

possible with some offensive capacity. Hence, merchant and fishing vessels, and even recreational vessels, were armed, and were called "auxiliary patrol vessels" -it is worth noting that some modern OPVs are based on the hulls of fishing vessels or boats of civil origin -. These units were equipped with machine guns and cannons that were technologically outdated at the time, however, with these weapons they constituted a threat to adversary merchant shipping, as well as enemy submarines, particularly vulnerable when sailing on the surface to recharge their batteries.

OPVs typically have a length (hull length) of about 30 meters (100 feet) and carry a medium caliber artillery piece as their main weapon, and several machine guns or light cannons on the sides, and even a CIWS. There are larger OPVs that have a heliport and hangar, which gives them greater capabilities and versatility. In some cases -for example in the navies of the

powers- there are patrol boats that mount more sophisticated weapons such as anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles or even torpedoes. The incorporation of these weapons makes it necessary to also integrate sensors and electronic systems suitable for their operation.

As for propulsion, the most modern ships can be equipped with gas turbines, or with CODAG-type mixed systems, which would allow them to reach speeds of up to 30 knots.

In general, the small size of the OPVs and their low cost -since they do not incorporate heavy weapons or high-performance electronics or sensors- make these ships an ideal option for small navies, or to save resources for larger navies. For this reason they are very popular.

There are also river patrol vessels, which, although with different characteristics and operating in different environments, essentially perform similar functions.

Main IPOs in service

Some of the most representative OPVs in the different countries are, in Australia, the Armidale , Tritón and Cape; in Brazil, the Grajaú and Imperial Marinheiro ; in Canada, the Kingstons and the Orcas; in China, the Shanghai , the Shantou , and the Beihai ; in Spain, the Meteoro, the Descubierta and the Serviola; in the United States, the Protector, Island and Sentinel ; in France the Floréal , the Flamant and the P400; in India the Vikram , the Tara Bai, and the Sukanya ; in Israel the Dabur , Shaldag MkII and the Super Dvora MkIII ; in Italy the Comandanti , the Cassiopea and the Zara; in Japan the Hida and the Aso; in Mexico the Azteca, the Tenochtitlán and the Durango; in Norway the Rapp and the Hauk ; in the UK there are the River , Castle

and Archer ; in Russia the Mirage , Svetlyak and the Rubin . In addition to those already mentioned, there are many other models at the service of these and other countries. As can be seen, there is a great variety of IPOs and there are many countries that use them.

Shipbuilding in Germany

Germany is the industrial engine of the European Union, a large number of German companies from different economic sectors occupy leading positions worldwide. Such is the case of shipbuilding. However, it should be noted that German shipyards are usually better known for their civil products than for their military achievements, since they are of temporary construction, while there is a much larger and more dynamic market for boats and ships. non-military employment. Here we present three of the main German shipyards and a brief review of them.

1) The Meyer Werft shipyard in Papenburg, founded in 1795, enjoys an excellent reputation for high-quality products. It is a family business, which is now managed by the seventh generation. It specializes in the manufacture of large cruise ships, having to its credit the manufacture of 38 modern luxury cruise ships. One of the most recently delivered is the *"Quantum of the Seas"* of the shipping company Royal Caribbean Cruises.

In order to expand its capacities (as if they were few), Meyer Werft acquired the Finnish SXT cruise shipyard in Turku in August 2014. It is worth noting that SXT enjoyed the record of having built the two largest cruise ships in the world, the *"Allure of the Seas"* and the *"Oasis of the Seas"*, which also belong to the company Royal Caribbean. The combination of know-how, the industrial capacity and facilities of

Meyer Werft and SXT, ensure control of the market for large cruise ships.

On its official website www.meyerwerft.de the shipyard promotes cruise ships and also ferries, research vessels, river cruisers, gas tankers, container ships, and specialized livestock carriers, but not military-type vessels. It is clear that, with all its capabilities and experience, ships the size of an aircraft carrier could be manufactured at its facilities, but for some reason this company does not address the military market. The author of this article did not find any reference to warships manufactured by this company, even during the world wars.

Lürssen shipyard Werft from Bremen, is another family business. It was founded in 1875. This company has specialized over time in the manufacture of large luxury yachts. With one peculiarity: it does not publish information about its clients or characteristics of the yachts it produces, it must be for security reasons. However, it has emerged that Prince Al- Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz Al - Saud, bought Lürssen Werft a private yacht of 180 meters, which by the way has been the longest yacht in the world. Keep in mind that, according to the rules of the sector, when we talk about luxury yachts, each linear meter has a base cost of one million euros, without forgetting that the extras are paid separately. This gives us an idea of what the Saudi prince's yacht could have cost. On the official website of the Lürssen shipyard Werft www.luerssen-yachts.com there is also no reference to military manufactures. As already mentioned, they specialize in luxury yachts.

3) The third German shipyard that we refer to in this writing is the Fassmer shipyard, in Berne, near Oldenburg, this is one of the main

providers of lifeboats worldwide. Just like Lurssen Werft and Meyer Werft, is a family business, it was founded in 1850. This company is characterized by the use of innovative materials, such as fiberglass reinforced polyester resin. Fassmer bets on innovation and flexibility. On its official website www.fassmer.de you can see a diverse portfolio of shipbuilding, which includes designs for the civil sector and also for the military sector. Precisely in this last field of action, Fassmer offers eight solutions that range from patrol boats of just 20 meters in length, to large patrol boats of 100 meters in length.

Among these solutions, the Navy of the Republic of Colombia chose two models to incorporate them into its surface fleet: the Offshore Patrol Vessel model 80, OPV-80, and the Coastal Patrol Vessel model 40, or CPV-40. These modern units come to complement the existing units, some of which have been in service for several

decades and are showing natural wear and tear as a result of intensive use in operations.

The OPV-80 of the German company Fassmer

The OPV-80 is a vessel designed by Fassmer to meet the potential demand for patrol vessels worldwide. Its first client was Chile, a country with which an agreement was made that allowed the manufacture of its ships by national shipyards, specifically the ASMAR shipyard, which allowed a transfer of technology that strengthened the shipbuilding sector of that southern country. The multi-mission concept allowed the Chilean Navy, user of the first ships, to carry out a set of complex operations, in optimal conditions and at a reasonable cost. Making the OPV-80 an emblematic design in the OPV market, mainly due to its performance, its efficiency, and its versatility.

The hull design is advanced, which makes the ship an extremely

seaworthy platform, ideal for multi-mission tasks. The upper deck layout offers a wide flight deck, which allows the operation of medium-sized helicopters, both day and night, the vessel being fully adapted to favor the operation of aircraft when pilots use NVG.

The OPV-80 can accommodate up to 3 interceptor boats, two of them on the sides, which can be launched and hoisted by means of their own cranes, and a third that can be up to 11 meters long and is located in the stern, and it is launched/retrieved by means of a special ramp.

The OPV-80 has a modular design, which makes it easy to integrate different weapons and sensors. It has the capacity to accommodate 100 people and can reach a maximum speed of 24 knots.

Among the most important technical characteristics of the OPV-80, we find:

Technical Characteristics of the OPV-80	
Design:	Fassmer .
Manufacturers:	Chile: ASMAR. Colombia: COTECMAR.
Operators:	Chilean Navy (4 units). Navy of the Republic of Colombia (3 units).
Type:	Offshore Patrol Vessel - IPO
Displacement:	1,723 tons.
Length:	80.6 meters.
Sleeve:	13 meters.
Openwork:	4.6 meters.
Propulsion:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 × Wärtsilä [1] 12V26 - output 4,080 kW each at 1,000 rpm. • CPP 4D775 with Lipstronic control system Advanced 7000. Wärtsilä SCV 62 gearbox. • 3 × Caterpillar 3412C 435 kVA at 1500 rpm. • 1 × Caterpillar 3056 105 kVA at 1500 rpm. • 2 x MD type aft shaft seals. • 2 × bow thrusters, 200 kW.
Speed:	Maximum: 21 knots. Economic: 12 knots.
Scope:	Minimum autonomy 4,400 nautical miles at 18 knots. Maximum autonomy 10,000 nautical miles at 12 knots.
Crew:	64 people. With a transport capacity of 36 additional people.
Sensors:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire control system: DESA ARIES Vision Master FT Integrated Bridging System (IBS) • Radars: 2 x Sperry Marine Bridge Master E X-Band Radars • 1 × Sperry Marine Bridge Master E S-Band Radar

Armament:	40mm/70 guns in gun position A. 12.7 mm (.50) machine guns in gun position B.
Embarked Helicopter:	Chile: AS.365 Dauphin N2 Colombia: Bo.105 or Bell 412
Aviation facilities:	Aft helipad. Medium sized helicopter hangar. Capability to refuel aviation.

From the now proven hull of the OPV-80, Fassmer has developed other models, for example, an auxiliary ship that includes a hospital, with an internal design modified precisely to provide more rooms. This vessel is intended for humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, including hospital and upgraded accommodation. Of course, without losing its capacity as a naval patrol vessel, and can also carry out the usual tasks of an OPV. Additionally, there is a joint Fassmer project with Beiderbeck Designs to produce a luxury yacht, using the OPV-80 hull

It is worth noting that Germany does not currently use OPV-80s. The first user was the Chilean Navy, a country that bought "on plans", with the offset commitment to manufacture its ships in Chilean shipyards. Similar business did the National Navy of Colombia. Thus, Chile manufactured its units at the ASMAR shipyard, and Colombia at the COTECMAR shipyard.

These are the data of the OPV-80 currently in service:

Country	Name	Number	Launching
	Pardo Pilot	OPV-81	17JUN2007
	Commander P. Bull	OPV-82	15OCT2008
	ARC July 20	PZE-46	22FEB2011
	ARC August 7	PZE-47	04SEP2013
	Sailor Dawnspring	OPV-83	13JUL2013
	ARC Victory	PZE-48	01DEC2016
	Corporal Odger	OPV-84	03AUG2016

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Fuerzas Antiterroristas del Mundo

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Tanzania

Tanzania People's Defense Force

The Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF), were established in September 1964, following a mutiny by the former colonial military force: the Tanganyika Rifles. From its inception, it was embedded in the new TPDF troops who were a popular force under civilian control. Unlike some of its neighbors, Tanzania has never experienced a coup or civil war.

The TPDF was given a specific mission: to defend Tanzania and everything in Tanzania, especially the people and their political ideology. Citizens of Tanzania can volunteer for military service from the age of 15 and 18 for compulsory military service upon graduation from high school. Recruitment service obligation is 2 years from 2004.

After an abortive mutiny in January 1964, the existing army was disbanded. The new force was titled the "Tanganyika Military Force", from January 25, 1964 to April 26, 1964. The Tanzanian government concluded that the old British model was not appropriate for the needs of an independent African state. Fresh recruits came from the youth wing of the Tanganyika African National Union. After the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the force was renamed the United Republic Military Force from April 27, 1964.

During the early years of the TPDF, the army was even smaller than the 2,000 decommissioned Tanganyika Rifles, the air force was minuscule, and a navy had not yet been formed. It appears that the new TPDF had three battalions in August 1965, stationed at Nachingwea, Colito Barracks (five miles from Dar es Salaam) and Tabora, in addition to the Zanzibari force of 1,000 not yet integrated. However, the army was four battalions strong in 1967.

From 1964 to 1974, the TPDF was commanded by Mrisho SH Sarakikya , trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, who was promoted from lieutenant to brigadier in 1964 and became the force's first commander. He was succeeded by Lieutenant General Abdallah Twalipo 1974-1980.

In 1972, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) listed the army as 10,000 strong, four infantry battalions, 20 T-59s, 14 Chinese T-62 light tanks, some BTR-40s and BTR-152s, Soviet field artillery and china, and mortars.

In 1992, the IISS included the army with 45,000 troops (about 20,000 conscripts), 3 division headquarters, 8 infantry brigades, one tank brigade, two field artillery battalions, two anti-aircraft artillery battalions (6 batteries), two mortars, two tank battalions, an engineer regiment (battalion size), and a surface-to-air missile battalion with SA-3s and SA-6s. The equipment included 30 Chinese Type 59 main battle tanks and 32 T-54/55s.

On March 9, 2009, the ground force command was officially created by then President Jakaya Kikwete . The ground force command was separated from the army and an official commander was appointed to direct ground force operations. In 2013, the other separate half of the military was officially incorporated as a new branch of the military to oversee the strategic planning and administration of all branches of the military called the Defense Force HQ Command.

Beginning in 2012, the army was gradually modernizing and restructuring. Much of the inventory is in stock or unreliable.

- 5 x infantry brigades.
- 1 x armored brigade.
- 3 x artillery battalions.
- 2 x air defense artillery battalions.
- 1 x mortar battalion.
- 2 x anti-tank battalions.
- 1 x Engineer Regiment (battalion size).
- 1 x central logistics/support group.

Air Force Command



Some of the Tanzanian Air Wing transports are still serviceable. However, its Shenyang F-5s and Chengdu F-7s are reported to fly only rarely due to airworthiness issues. Tanzania's long coastline means the transports are also used for patrol flights.

On November 14, 2013, Helmoed-Römer Heitman reported for Jane's Defense Weekly that Jane's had been informed by a "generally reliable source" that the TPDF had replaced its 12 aging J-7 CAC fighters with 14 new

J-7s, twelve single-seat and two double-seat deliveries. they were completed in 2011. Heitman also reported that the aircraft was fully operational at Dar es Salaam and Mwanza airbases.

Some estimates suggest that the Tanzanian Air Force Command operates 32 aircraft in 3 different types. They are believed to operate 14 fighters, 11 fixed-wing attack aircraft and 7 transport aircraft. On October 1, 2015, a Tanzanian Air Force Command K-8 trainer plane crashed into the sea, killing both pilots.

Naval Command



The navy operates 9 fast attack craft and 12 patrol boats.

Jane's Defense Weekly wrote in August 2017 that '...a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) flotilla consisting of a destroyer, a frigate and a supply ship visited Dar es Salaam on 16 and 20 August'. Rear Admiral Makanzo said during the visit that Tanzania currently has two marine infantry companies, both trained by PLAN, and the training of a third company plans to start with Chinese assistance.

The admiral said that Tanzanian marines were deployed at the time in peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.



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