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This newsletter has a Spanish version.

Editorial

In the first article of this installment, our senior analyst Guadi Calvo makes a general analysis of the situation in the Sahel, as an explanation of the migratory crisis that is occurring in Ceuta. A crisis that could deepen, given that the region is quite unstable and people are trying to escape the great dangers that beset them there. In this order of ideas, the illegal migrants who massively try to reach the beaches of Ceuta should be considered refugees.

In the second article, the decision of the French president in relation to the military operations in Mali is reviewed, and how this can weaken the government of that African country, to the point that its armed forces could be overwhelmed by terrorist groups, with consequences unimaginable. The parallel between Mali and Chad is interesting, and how this comparison generates confusion as to the motivations or intentions of the French government in this case.

Precisely, in the following analysis, Guadi Calvo delves into the situation in Chad, and into its complex relationship with the successive governments of France, a country that is extremely interested in having a loyal ally in that privileged place in the African geography, which explains why Paris tolerates and supports the dictatorial government in Chad, while calling for democracy for Mali.

This edition ends with a review of aeronautical maintenance in the Colombian Armed Forces.

We invite our valued readers to continue taking care of themselves in the face of the threat posed by the current pandemic.

Know to win!

Douglas Hernández

Editor



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In northern Europe there is something called the vault at the end of the world. Which is basically an underground seed bank, buried in the permafrost of one of the Norwegian Svalbard islands. Millions of seeds, from thousands and thousands of plant species, are stored there in an attempt to protect biodiversity and/or have a biological reserve in case of an apocalyptic event. Latin American countries have great biodiversity, but no such idea. It is necessary that we also take similar measures. It is simple. The first thing is to determine which are the most representative species of each natural region, and collect seeds and genetic material from them, to store it in a network of regional facilities, in charge of scientists from the Armed Forces (this is national security). From there, samples would be sent to a national facility in the capital, and to a strategic reserve on a sufficiently isolated island, which in the case of Colombia could be Gorgona. And "voila", we are covered, and we have something better than what the Norwegians did.

On the cover, *Prince Mateen of Brunei* in military uniform. In this edition, the guest is the Brunei Army. See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who freely and disinterestedly have sent us their articles for this issue.

Refugees: An explanation to Ceuta

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Ceuta authorities mobilized army troops to contain/control the wave of migrants.

Perhaps to understand the reasons for the recent invasion of the Ceuta beach of Tarajal, beyond the encouragement given by the Moroccan crown, (See Ceuta: Scraps on the beach) to the thousands of Africans, who both from Morocco, as well as the who try to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean from different ports in the Maghreb, shows that, although the situation has been going on for decades, the crisis, both economic and security, is deepening to the point of producing these overflows, forcing millions of soulless to jump into the sea or board intractable boats, to plunge into an adventure, which as has already happened to some forty thousand souls, the adventure can end in the bed of the Mediterranean.

While France and the United States, along with dozens of nations and international organizations, pressure the Malian National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) and its leader, Colonel Assimi Goïta, who on May 25 evicted President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, (See:

Mali, instability as a form of government) for the return to the 2020 post-coup roadmap, which would lead to the presidential elections in 2022, an issue that, at least formally, , the CNSP has not undone, the West does not do the same with Chad, which is practically in the same situation, since after the death of President Idriss Déby, (See: Chad, the perfect storm) he assumed power, his son, General Mahamat Déby, who along with his military clique annulled the current constitution and closed parliament and not a word about possible elections.

In this context, the West only seems interested in teaching "good democratic manners" to the Malian colonels, who apparently could not control; perhaps due to the training of several of them, including Colonel Goïta, in Russian military academies, while he does not comment on the constant denunciations about the violation of the "rule of law" and human rights in Chad and the rest of the continent that is burning .

On a daily basis, we are seeing how Wahhabi terrorism is gaining more and more ground throughout the continent, even breaking the arms of powerful states such as the Nigerian, where President Muhammadu Buhari is about to lose the northeastern state of Borno at the hands of of the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), which has just sealed its victory in the internal war with Boko Haram, with until now the unconfirmed death of its leader Abubakar Shekau (See The new death of Abubakar Shekau) weeded its He walked as "brothers", now he can and is willing to use all his resources against Abuja.

Beyond the agonizing situation in the western Sahel, the rest of Africa continues to increase security crises; the political erosion of the Somali president, Mohamed Farmajo Abdullahi, who continues to hide the date of the elections, generating as much instability as the fundamentalist group al Shabbab has been doing for more than a decade, which already openly operates in the coastal

region of Kenya, not only as it has done for years with sporadic attacks and bombings, but also presenting combat to the Kenyan army, which aggravates the diplomatic crisis between Nairobi and Mogadishu up to now. In the same Horn of Africa, the war in Tigray (Ethiopia) that began last November, beyond the defeat of the rebels, has triggered the number of internal refugees, persecuted by the Eritrean troops, rejected by the Ethiopian troops and no place in the refugee camps that were built along the border with Sudan, (See: Ethiopia, at the time of the dead) which means that thousands of people seven months into the conflict, find themselves in a distressing limbo of physical security and legal protection, without any significant organization working to resolve the crisis.

The terrorist actions last March by Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamaa (Followers of the Traditional Path or Defenders of Tradition), tributaries of Daesh, against the city of Palma (Mozambique: The war sets the north on fire) in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado, on March 24, not only froze the operations of the French Total with an investment of more than 4 billion dollars, but the security crisis is far from over, thousands of residents of Palma have left the city and refuse to return, while the true balance of dead and missing is not known, and from what is observed that, given the success obtained, the group is preparing a new assault, surely, well before the end of the year.

In Egypt, the war against terrorism that has practically shielded the Sinai Peninsula, without it being clearly known what

is happening inside, the constant bloodletting produced in the depths of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where every day we have breakfast with dozens of deaths produced after attacks by insurgent groups of all stripes and terrorists linked to Daesh, and Darfur in Sudan, where massacres have once again taken place inside the refugee camps; Together with Libya, in its chronic civil war, still far from over, they are other sources of expulsion of people who will undoubtedly seek to escape at any price.

Burkina Faso, the pearl of terror

If the scenario outlined above is inhospitable, the current situation in the western Sahel and particularly Burkina Faso leaves no doubt that the security crisis has settled in Africa and plans to remain there ad infinitum. Although the critical situation with terrorism in the north of Mali, Niger and Chad is overwhelming, since 2015 Burkina Faso has become the pearl of terror, its north devastated and practically abandoned by its inhabitants, it is still hit by the terrorist groups that move across the borders, as what they are, a simple trace on an insignificant piece of paper.

During the night of last Friday to Saturday, attacks took place against two villages in the province of Yagha, close to the borders between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The first against the village of Tadaryat, in which some fifteen people died and the other in Solhan, about fifteen kilometers from Sebba, the provincial capital, in which the dead exceeded 160,

including twenty minors. According to local sources, the first of the attacks was carried out around two in the morning against a post of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland, (VDP), a self-defense force made up of civilians with little or no military experience, after the first obstacle, the mujahideen moved to the center of the village proceeding to slaughter, followed by looting and burning houses.

These attacks come just a week after two other attacks in the same area in which four other people died. Between May 17 and 18, fifteen villagers and a soldier had died in the area, when on May 14, the Defense Minister, Chériff Sy, who had moved to Sebba, assured that the situation had returned to normal, after numerous army operations. As a result of a series of terrorist attacks in the Foutouri district, in the east of the country, in which the Daesh assassinated in the village of Kodyel, on May 3, some fifteen members of the VDP and as many other members of the army and twenty civilians were wounded.

According to all-too-official figures, since 2015, the year in which they began to operate in Burkina Faso, both the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM) belonging to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in West Africa (EIAO) franchise of the global Daesh, some 1400 civilians would have died and the displaced would reach one million. Of which many will join the columns of migrants determined to throw themselves into the sea before the hell they leave behind catches up with them.

Image Source:

<https://daniellebrato.files.wordpress.com/2021/05/crisis-in-ceuta.jpg>

Guadi Bald

(Argentina) Argentine writer and journalist. International Analyst specialized in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.

Mali: Too bad to be true

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Patch identifying French troops operating in Mali, under Operation Barkhane .

The recent coup in Mali (Mali, instability as a form of government) has given France the excuse it needed to start moving away from the Sahelian country . President Emmanuel Macron has already decided that the men of Operation Barkhane , 5,100 troops, in Mali since 2012, then known as Operation Serval, will not carry out joint operations with the Forces armées Maliennes (FAMA).

Nine years from now, the Barkhane has not only been unable to contain the mujahideen, who make up a profuse spectrum of terrorist gangs, which respond to Daesh and al-Qaeda, but they continue to spread to neighboring nations. Despite the intense efforts of Paris and the United Nations with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), with a staff of 15,000 troops, no significant achievements have been achieved.

Macron's decision, which he advanced, could lead to the total withdrawal of French troops, has undoubtedly been sifted by the presidential elections that he will

have to face next year and the latest polls show that the French, who in 2013 supported the military presence in Mali by more than 73 percent, it is now down to less than 50 percent and falling. Perhaps the nine years without success, the fifty dead French soldiers, the hundreds wounded and the billions of euros invested, among those funds the squandering, of the resources used for the training of some 16 thousand Malian soldiers, trained by the Mission of Formation of the European Union in Mali (EUTM) of whose results the European authorities have not been able to give explanations, reason why it is suspected that the high command of the FAMA , today run by the movement of the colonels, have diverted many of those funds for their own benefit.

Added to this situation of exhaustion in French society are the statements made by General François Lecointre , Chief of Staff of the French Army, in a parliamentary hearing, where he admitted that "there will never be a definitive victory against the jihadists" in the

Sahel, have contributed to the fall in these polls.

According to other analysts, Macron's move is only trying to put pressure on Colonel Assimi Goïta , who on Monday the seventh, before the Supreme Court, was officially sworn in as the new president, and the members of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), who support him, so that they return to the route traced, after the coup of the year past, in which elections had been scheduled for 2022, which was never in discussion and Goïta reconfirmed after his oath.

In accordance with Macron's decision, different Western and African political, military and economic entities, from the United States, the European Union (EU) to the Pan-African Parliament, the AfDB (African Development Bank) or the G5Sahel have removed the I support Colonel Goïta and his men, who, in addition to receiving strong support from the Malian people, has broadened his political base, reaching a broad political consensus, never before achieved

in the country. Counting as Prime Minister, with Choguel Maïga , head of the June 5 Movement -Group of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), the most important opposition coalition in Mali and Imam Mahmoud Dicko , the country's main religious leader, whose Friday sermons draw thousands of people to Bamako. In addition, the CNSP, in agreement with the powerful Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), which brings together all the political expressions of the Tuareg people, who have always claimed the territory of Azawad as their own, which has triggered many armed conflicts, their The last revolt in 2012 was the beginning of the political and security crisis that the country has been experiencing ever since.

Faced with this panorama, of great political agreement and respect for what was agreed after the coup of August 2020, (See: Mali, more than a military coup) that would end in presidential elections next year. It remains to be asked , what are Macron's real motivations, to pressure Mali in such a way, when in Chad, where after the death of President Idriss Déby, a military clique, calling itself the Revolutionary Military Council, led by his son General Mahamat Déby, after which they quickly annulled the constitution, closed the parliament , established a curfew, initiating an intense wave of repression, without Paris having an opinion on the matter, (See: Chad, the storm perfect), but quite the opposite. Macron not only endorsed the new government with his hasty trip to N'Djamena , but also attended the

Mahamat Déby inauguration ceremony.

The orphan of Mali

France's move, with its partial withdrawal for now, leaves Bamako in much more precarious conditions and forced to seek new partners, not only to resolve the economic issue, but fundamentally the military issue, which will not reverse the situation, that the Sahelian country begins to play in tandem with nothing less than Moscow, since the new Prime Minister is a benchmark of the African left and has close relations with the Kremlin.

Russia, since the coup last August, has strengthened ties with the leaders of the CNSP, for example Colonel Sadio Camara , who a few weeks before the 2020 coup, had visited Moscow, and who had taken charge of the Strategic Defense Ministry. While, since last year, until today in most of the pro-CNSP demonstrations, flags of the Russian Federation and anti-French banners are observed, opening a new square to Moscow, where it is collaborating with the government and the peacekeepers of the United Nations, against rebel groups, fragmented into some twelve organizations. What Macron denies, arguing that Central African President Faustin-Archange Touadéra is actually a prisoner of the Russian "mercenaries".

Regardless of the fact that the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane will make it possible for the khatibas of Daesh and al-Qaeda to escalate, which in a few weeks could reach Bamako, Macron seems unaware

that the conflict in northern Mali is not limited to that territory, but for years, it has overflowed Burkina Faso and Chad, just a few days ago in the Burkina Faso province of Yagha , 140 peasants were killed by one of the terrorist groups operating in the north of that country (See: Refugees: An explanation to Ceuta).

Trying to counteract the possible French absence, Algeria has just announced that it is willing to cooperate militarily with Mali, a country with which it shares a highly permeable 1,330-kilometre border, so that the FAMA are not overwhelmed by terrorists.

Relaunching the Joint Operational Staff Committee (Cémoc) created in April 2010 in which Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger participate to coordinate military cooperation and carry out joint military operations to deal with heavy weapons trafficking, drug trafficking , kidnappings and the instability of the Sahel region, an organization that was practically paralyzed by the Sahel Group 5 (GS5) made up of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso, created at the request of the Europeans.

France, after these nine years of presence in the Sahel, seems to be repeating the same model of flight that the United States is implementing in Afghanistan, where after twenty years, it withdraws, with a much stronger Taliban than in 2001, leaving to civil society at the whim of the mullah. Too bad a scenario to be true.

Image Source:

https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/sahel-trois-questions-sur-la-fin-de-l-operation-barkhane_2154656.html



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Chad, the necessary dictatorship

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



T-59G tank of Chinese origin, belonging to the Chadian Army.

The new military coup in Mali (See: Mali, instability as a form of government) carried out by a group of young colonels, with a strong nationalist imprint, threatens to further unbalance the unsustainable presence of France in Africa in general and in the Sahel in particular, dragged into this situation, beyond its long and perverse colonialist presence, its notorious failure in the war, which since 2012, has waged against groups that respond to al-Qaeda and Daesh, in northern Mali, whom they do not could contain, and that have managed to filter into neighboring nations, widening a front that threatens to spread even further.

Given this accumulation of errors, it is now a priority for Paris to maintain cohesion with its allies in the region, so the new situation of Chad, a fundamental partner whose geographical position links Central and Western Africa with Sudan and the Maghreb, has become more complex after the death in combat against insurgent forces on April 18 of the dictator and great friend of France Idriss Déby, which was

followed by a "disguised" coup against the constitutional system, after which the executive, the Assembly National and the Constitution. Climbing up the dead president's son, General Mahamat Déby, together with a group of soldiers, closing the flimsy democratic process with which France intended to present to the world one of its greatest partners on the continent

The closed constitution provided that in the event of the disappearance of the head of state, the head of parliament should be appointed as interim president, who would call for elections within ninety days, and that the president should be over 45 years of age and have no rank. military, conditions that Mahamat Déby does not have, since he is 38 years old and is an army general.

Apparently they have decided to continue the "ideology" of their father that can be summed up in two words: corruption and repression, which has led their country, after thirty years in power, to 187th place in the Human Development Index of the Program of the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) of the 189 countries measured, which did not prevent him from forming one of the most powerful armies in Africa.

The military junta headed by the son of the dictator, goaded by reality, to continue in power has resorted to repression; to contain the social discontent expressed in the increasingly widespread presence of civil society in the streets of N'Djamena and other cities where an undetermined number of citizens have been killed, detained, tortured and disappeared ; without taking our eyes off the armed rebellion, carried out by at least four groups made up of former soldiers, in the northwest of the country, the front in which President Déby died.

The "ideology" of Idriss Déby, was throughout his life, the persecution, imprisonment, torture and death of his rivals, always tolerated by the French governments , which succeeded each other democratically in l'Élysée . French presidents who, in order not to lose everything, demanded that their conspicuous partner moderate their forms and somehow tolerate a

democratic mask, with which they managed to remain in power by winning six consecutive elections, the last one on April 11, in which that he was re-elected "only" by 79.32% of the votes, which in the end he was able to enjoy very little. The claims of the Chadian society are not only due to the constitutional breakdown, finally an entelechy, due to the negative figures that are constantly reported in all the measurements on living conditions despite its oil potential. Chad is one of the five poorest nations in the world, with a population close to 17 million people, with a life expectancy of 53 years, one of the lowest in the world, where only 6% have electricity; 8% with access to sewers and drinking water. Only one adult in five knows how to read and write. While 6 million people need humanitarian aid to survive, it is estimated that almost another two million will be added this year. All this degradation, already tolerated by France, which has continuously supported the Chad dictatorship, selling it weapons, training its troops and taking advantage of the oil deals with the dictator.

preparing for war

Beyond the continuity of the war against the insurgent groups, which have used the Libyan chaos, not only to take refuge, but in many cases as a source of financing renting for the sides in combat, vital for the current ruling junta in N'Djamena, using the instability to repress the civilian population and presenting themselves to the

international community as a victim of terrorism.

Perhaps one of the clearest proofs of this objective has been the refusal of the government of General Mahamat Déby to accept the proposal for a ceasefire and dialogue from the Front pour la alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT), the most powerful insurgent group it fights. The dictatorial junta not only rejected the proposal, but also publicly denied any possibility of negotiation. Which will undoubtedly prolong the war. This situation opens the possibility that the rest of the organizations that fight against the military, fundamentally in the east and north of the country, join the FACT and precipitate the violence of the military junta against the small communities of the region where the armed groups They have a lot of presence and collaboration.

Although according to some sources, sectors of the army have made it known that the unity in that force is not as solid as it is believed and there is the possibility that in the coming months that crack will begin to become more visible, which, without a doubt, for France It is good news and he will have to expose himself to choosing one of the sides in the conflict within the Armed Forces. Of which many units are well armed and trained, thanks to the campaigns against terrorism in which they have participated: in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, Sudan and Libya and other missions, accompanying the forces of the United Nations.

Versions of a break within the army suggest that the unit most prone to an uprising is the General Directorate of the Security Service of State Institutions or DGSSIE, the powerful elite special force to which Idriss Déby, at the time, He gave great autonomy and budget, using it as a national military intelligence service and personal guard, putting his son Mahamat in charge in 2014, and which he directed until just a couple of months ago. In addition to other battalions made up of different ethnic groups from Chad, a key factor to understand the possibility of alignments in the event of a conflict within the army.

Without forgetting that, on the border with Nigeria, Chad is in constant confrontation with the breakaway faction of Boko Haram, Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), in its most glorious moment after having eliminated the fearsome Abubakar Shekau, Boko leader Haram (See: Nigeria, The new death of Abubakar Shekau), who wants to expand beyond the borders of Nigeria, to confirm his achievements and establish himself as the most important fundamentalist khatiba in Africa.

All the problems that the new military junta in Chad has today are also problems for France, so Emanuel Macron must measure every move he makes in that country, so that they do not play against him in the presidential elections of April 2022. Therefore, a dictatorship is very necessary, which it must support at any price.

Image Source:
www.armyrecognition.com



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Organizan:

Aeronautical maintenance in the Colombian Armed Forces

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter being modernized at the 5th Air Combat Command , Rionegro (Antioquia)

Colombia has been a violent country since its origins. Throughout its history it has had multiple civil wars and internal conflicts, for the most diverse causes, which have caused rivers of blood to flow and have devastated entire regions. Today there is a political-military conflict that has lasted six decades and that, in addition to guerrilla warfare, involves issues of terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, making it much more complex to understand and solve.

Currently, criminals/terrorists are very well armed and equipped, financed with resources from drug trafficking and other crimes such as kidnapping and extortion, have control over some territories, carry out terrorist acts on a regular basis, and represent a constant threat to institutions. .

The Colombian Military Forces and Police have had to adapt to face a set of new phenomena that affect national security and democratic stability, simultaneously and persistently, acquiring a set of differential capabilities, which are of interest to other Armed Forces. that are facing problems similar to those that Colombia has been fighting for many years.

The challenge for the Colombian Armed Forces has been enormous, to say the least, since it is necessary to take into account the great territorial extension of the country, with the presence of innumerable rivers, jungle or mountainous areas, and all kinds of natural obstacles, which make it difficult to State presence and ground military operations, opening spaces for criminals/terrorists to operate. Additionally, the number of military and police is insufficient to control the territory and face all threats. What is surprising is not that the Public Force has not been able to win this 60-year war, what is surprising is that it has not lost it, having so many tactical and strategic elements against it.

It is clear that, in Colombia, one of the decisive factors that has allowed the Military and Police Forces to contain the system of threats, and force some violent actors to negotiate or demobilize, has been the massive use of aerial means, and the mastery of the air itself. Thanks to the air resources available, it has been possible to quickly mobilize troops from one place to another in the Colombian geography, changing the balance of forces and achieving relative superiority in each case; it has been possible to carry

out effective aerial reconnaissance that has subsequently made successful operations possible; it has been possible to keep the troops on the ground supplied, as well as to evacuate personnel and support the civilian population, and it has been possible to neutralize personnel, aircraft, ships, semi-submersibles, runways, installations and other resources of subversion, drug trafficking and the terrorism, weakening its structures and constantly dismantling its plans and actions.

Air power is fundamental to maintaining the military superiority of the Colombian State, and the Colombian Armed Forces depend to a great extent on the material available to be able to fulfill their constitutional mission. Today it would be unthinkable to do without planes, helicopters and drones to support land and naval military operations, even less so in a country like Colombia, which faces a system of persistent, complex, multidimensional, diffuse and transnational threats.

In this situational framework, the Colombian Armed Forces have been progressively equipping themselves with more and better air resources, mostly oriented towards counterinsurgency or low-intensity conflicts, hence, for example, the replacement of Kfir veterans by aircraft modern combat vehicles that dissuade *potential* external enemies, has been delayed so much, while every year more helicopters are bought to support surface operations against *real enemies*, who every day threaten society, national security, and against democratic stability.

The large number of helicopters, transport planes, reconnaissance/intelligence planes, tactical support planes, and drones, makes it possible to have capabilities, but it has also brought consequences that cannot be lost sight of. Among them, we can mention:

- It has become necessary to develop the physical infrastructure to deploy the aircraft.
- It has become necessary to train a significant number of pilots and technicians to operate and maintain the aircraft in optimal conditions.
- There is a significant expense for aviation fuel, spare parts and supplies.
- There is significant spending on maintenance activities for aircraft, infrastructure and equipment associated with aeronautical operations.
- Military personnel complete certain cycles in their careers, which eventually lead to their retirement from military institutions. Of course, this also happens with the pilots and technicians, who, in the Colombian case, have invaluable accumulated experience, which is transferred to the private sector.
- The commanders must decide who they buy aviation fuel from, as well as the spare parts and supplies necessary for the operation of the aerial material and associated equipment.
- The controls must decide who they hire to carry out the maintenance of the aircraft and

the equipment associated with the aeronautical operation.

Regarding aircraft maintenance, it should be noted that in Colombia a state company called the Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation SA (CIAC SA) was created in 1956, whose main objective was/is to operate repair, service and maintenance centers aircraft, and eventually even manufacture them. The CIAC is part of the group of companies attached to the Vice Ministry of the Social and Business Group for Defense (GSED), of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense, and currently has significant capabilities to support the Colombian Armed Forces, the national and international civil sector, and to the Armed Forces of other countries. Among those capabilities, we can mention:

- Manufacture of light training aircraft Calima T-90 (Lancair Legacy FG).
- Modernization of Embraer Tucano AT-27 aircraft (certified by Embraer).
- Scheduled depot Maintenance (PDM) to C-130 Hercules aircraft.
- Modernization of UH-1 helicopters to HUEY II.
- Modernization of UH-60A helicopters to UH-60L (Alfa to Lima). Photo illustrating this review.
- Design and manufacture of Remotely Manned Aircraft (Coelum, Quimbaya, others).
- Major maintenance to Boeing C-40 aircraft.
- Maintenance, repair and OVERHAUL (MRO) for aircraft B-737, A-320 and ATR-42/72, for which it has the approval of the civil aviation regulatory authorities of Colombia (UAEAC) and the United States (FAA).

Due to the experience and know acquired by the CIAC over years of efficient operation, the maintenance or modernization of the aircraft of the Colombian Military Forces are usually contracted through this company, and also usually involve the Air Maintenance Command (CAMAN) of the Colombian Air Force (FAC).

It should be noted that several companies dedicated to aeronautical maintenance have been founded in the country, headed by military personnel in good retirement. Who put all their experience and capabilities at the service of the national and international aeronautical market. Incidentally, the operational conditions in Colombia are so intense that they require the maximum effort of pilots and technicians, in such a way that their flight hours and effective hours of maintenance work usually exceed the international average, at least in this region. It is usual for the CIAC to hire these companies for routine maintenance tasks, and also for special projects, thus taking advantage of the know-how of these retired personnel.

In the Colombian war there are unusual situations that have allowed the development of endogenous

solutions, such as the creation of armor for aircraft, or the treatment with special paints of the floor of helicopters to prevent it from being corroded by the blood that is usually spilled there. . In Colombia they have also taken semi-wings created to hold fuel tanks, and have adapted to carry weapons; parts and pieces that have already been discontinued on the market have been manufactured locally, thereby enabling the continued operation of old aircraft, and all sorts of ingenious logistical solutions have been implemented to keep the aircraft operating and to be able to fulfill the mission.

It is worth noting that, in each Air Command of the Colombian Air Force, there are maintenance personnel for the different systems and subsystems, including electronics, weapons, optronics, motors, electricity, propellers, and other critical components. And that, in the Air Maintenance Command (CAMAN) of the Colombian Air Force, there are important additional capabilities to support the institution as a whole.

Aeroindustrial Group (GRUAI) is in charge of repairing and designing aeronautical components, to enable the FAC to dominate the air, space and cyberspace. The GRUAI currently has 872 maintenance capacities, which allows repairing about 2,584 aircraft components in its 22 workshops, thus supporting the readiness of the institution's aircraft.

The different units of the FAC, following the guidelines of the Logistics Headquarters, carry out a detailed planning of their needs, thus contributing to the Master Production Plan (PMP). This has made it possible to reduce logistics response times, by streamlining the acquisition of spare parts and the timely scheduling of the work to be carried out in the different GRUAI workshops.

The PMP grants many advantages to the FAC, for example, it allows having high turnover components

repaired in the warehouse before they are required, thus facilitating scheduled inspections (TBO's for Time Between Overhaul), being that, when the maintenance time of a component, the unit receives the replacement component to be installed in the corresponding aircraft, without this having to be removed from operations. Thus, contributing to the enlistment of the FAC.

Additionally, repairs at the CAMAN GRUAI are faster, more efficient and cheaper than if they were done abroad. For example, the overhaul of the Fuel Control Unit (FCU) takes 45 days abroad, not counting shipping times, while in the CAMAN it takes only 20 days; another example is that of the landing gear of the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano tactical support aircraft , whose repair abroad can take six months, while in the CAMAN it takes only three months. In some of the inspections or repairs carried out in the CAMAN GRUAI, savings of up to 74% are achieved, in relation to the same work carried out abroad. Obviously the GRUAI provides an important service to support the air operations of the Colombian Air Force.

The GRUAI has presented all the necessary documentation to accredit three of its workshops as an Authorized Maintenance Organization (OMA), before the Special Administrative Unit of Civil Aeronautics. Finding the process in the phase of evaluation of documents and inspection by the Colombian aeronautical authority.

I close this brief review commenting that the combatants of the Colombian Armed Forces, who are in the front line facing all sorts of criminals, terrorists and drug traffickers, largely depend on air support, and that air support depends in turn on maintenance technicians aviation, who with their quiet work have made possible important operational successes.

Douglas Hernandez

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World Anti-Terrorist Forces

Audentes Fortuna iuvat



The Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah , reviews his troops.

Kingdom of Brunei **Brunei Army**

The Royal Brunei Land Forces were formed in May 1961 with the formation of the Brunei Malay Regiment, when the first induction of 60 conscripts began training. The formal foundation of the regiment occurred in June 1962 with three rifle companies. In 1965, the regiment was given the royal prefix, becoming the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment. Its initial headquarters was Port Dickson in Malaya, but it was soon moved to a purpose-built barracks in Brunei. The Royal Brunei Malay Regiment established two new units in 1965, the Boat Section and the Air Service, to further increase its capabilities. These two units, along with the infantry, were merged into a single task force in 1966.

In 1972 the structure of the regiment was changed, with the infantry, aviation and naval sections divided into separate units once again. The infantry companies became the Royal Brunei Malay 1st Battalion Regiment , with a total of five rifle companies. Three years later, the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment was formed, by separating Companies B and E from the 1st Battalion.

In 1984, Brunei achieved full independence from the United Kingdom. At that time, the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment was renamed Royal Brunei Land Forces , part of the now broader Royal Brunei Armed Forces. In 1990, the Support Battalion was formed, comprising an armored reconnaissance squadron, an air defense battery and a combat engineer squadron, along with maintenance and administrative support. In 1994, the Royal Brunei Land Forces 3rd Battalion was formed from members of Company D, 1st Battalion RBLF and Company

F, 2nd Battalion RBLF, while the air defense battery and engineering workshop they transferred from the Support Battalion to the Royal Brunei Air Force and Support Service respectively.

On July 9, 2011, the RBLF conducted trials to replace their BDU DPM uniforms with Digital Disruptive Pattern BDUs under a contract with the company Force-21 Equipment, of Singapore.



Organization

The Royal Brunei Land Forces are organized into four separate battalions:

- First Battalion
- Second Battalion
- Third Battalion
- Support Battalion

First Battalion

The First Battalion was established in 1962; the organization consisted of the first three incorporations that underwent basic military training. Initially, the unit was based at Segenting Camp, Port Dickson, Malaysia. It was later transferred to the Berakas Garrison in 1975, renamed the Land Force, with five Rifle Companies (A, B, C, D and E).

Second Battalion

The 2nd Battalion was formed on 2 January 1975 at the Bolkiah Garrison. Prior to this, the Battalion was made up of Company B and E of the First Battalion. The battalion moved to Camp Tutong on May 10, 1976.

Third Battalion

The Third Battalion was formed and established on May 31, 1994. The battalion consisted of First Battalion's Company D and Second Battalion's Company F and Command Company of the First and Second Battalions. Based in Penanjong Garrison, on June 21, 2007, the Battalion has moved to a new camp at Lumut, in the Belait district.

Support Battalion

The Support Unit was originally established on the basis of five main units; namely, an armored reconnaissance squadron, a combat engineer squadron, an air defense battery, the Penanjong workshop, and

the Penanjong Garrison HQ . It was reorganized on January 2, 1990 and officially established as the Support Battalion, comprising three main units; namely, an Armored Reconnaissance Squadron, a Combat Engineer Squadron, and the Battalion Headquarters Support Company.



International Cooperation

The Royal Brunei Land Forces have significant links with the British Army, largely due to the fact that there is a permanent British garrison in Brunei. After the Brunei revolt in 1962, an agreement was signed between Brunei and the United Kingdom stating that a battalion of Gurkhas would be stationed in the country to protect British interests in the country, especially the important oil installations in Seria. The current garrison consists of a Royal Gurkha Rifles battalion, plus some Army Air Corps helicopters , providing support. However, Brunei is also used by the British Army in general to train jungle warfare tactics. The Brunei Forces carry out constant joint training with the British forces stationed in that country. Additionally, it trains frequently with the Malaysian and Singaporean armies, and occasionally with the Armed Forces of Australia, China, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Thailand.

Brunei Armed Forces carry out the Cooperation exercise Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) with the Marine Corps of the United States of America.

Team

The RBLF uses a mix of imported equipment from various suppliers (mainly British, but also French, German, Russian, Indonesian and Ukrainian).

9x19mm Browning HP pistol. Parabellum . Belgium.

Pindad G2 pistol , Indonesia.

5.56x45mm M16A1/A2/A4 assault rifles . NATO. USA (Standard Infantry Rifle).

SAR 21 assault rifles. Singapore.

Heckler and Koch HK416 assault rifles. Germany.

9x19mm MP5 submachine guns. Parabellum . Germany. Used by the Special Forces Regiment (RPK)

MP7 submachine guns, 4.6 x 30 mm. Germany. Used by the Special Forces Regiment (RPK)

5.56x45mm NATO Ultimax 100 Light Machine Guns . Singapore.

Browning M2 .50 BMG Heavy Machine Gun. USA

7.62x51mm FN MAG-58 general purpose machine gun. NATO. Belgium

M203 grenade launcher. USA

Armbrust Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher . Germany.
C90-CR (M3) Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher. Spain.
(Manpads). France.
16 Light Tanks FV101 Scorpion CVR (T). United Kingdom.
45 Armored Transport VAB. France.



2 FV105 Sultan armored command vehicles. United Kingdom.
2 FV106 Samson armored recovery vehicles. United Kingdom.
-Thalab Light Armored Assault Vehicles . Jordan.
6 105 mm L118 towed howitzers. United Kingdom.
24 Mortars of 81 mm L16. United Kingdom.
Land Rover Defender military light utility vehicle . United Kingdom.
Handalan I/II troop carrier truck. Malaysia.
KM 450 light utility vehicle. South Korea.
Mercedes-Benz Actros Tractor Truck .
Mercedes-Benz Atego truck .
Iveco Eurocargo truck
Banshee Drones . United Kingdom.
5 KH -27 boats, used for patrols and search and rescue operations.



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